Qualified Immunity’s Boldest Lie
Joanna C. Schwartz†
Qualified immunity shields government officials from damages liability—even
if they have violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights—so long as they have not violated “clearly established law.” The Supreme Court has explained that watershed
cases describing legal requirements—like Graham v. Connor and Tennessee v. Garner—are alone insufficient to clearly establish the law. Instead, the plaintiff must
find prior cases applying Graham and Garner to cases with facts virtually identical
to their own case, explaining that such factually analogous cases are necessary to
put officers on notice of the illegality of their conduct. But do officers actually know
about the facts and holdings of these cases, and rely on them when taking action?
Courts and commentators have been skeptical of this assumption, but it has never
been tested.
This Article reports the findings of a study, the first of its kind, examining the
role that circuit decisions applying Graham and Garner play in police officers’ policies, trainings, and briefings. Having viewed hundreds of police policies, training
outlines, and other briefing materials provided to California law enforcement officers, I describe unequivocal proof that officers are not notified of the facts and holdings of cases that clearly establish the law for qualified immunity purposes. Instead,
officers are taught the general principles of Graham and Garner and then are
trained to apply those principles in the widely varying circumstances that come
their way.
Moreover, even if law enforcement agencies made more of an effort to educate
their officers about court decisions analyzing the constitutional limits of force, the
expectations of notice and reliance baked into qualified immunity doctrine would be
obviously unrealistic. There could never be sufficient time to train officers about all
the court cases that might clearly establish the law. And even if officers were trained
about the facts and holdings of some portion of these cases, there is no reason to
believe that officers would analogize or distinguish situations rapidly unfolding before them to the court decisions they once studied.
There is a growing consensus among courts, scholars, and advocates across the
ideological spectrum that qualified immunity doctrine is legally unsound, unnecessary to shield government officials from the costs and burdens of litigation, and destructive to police accountability efforts. This Article reveals another reason to
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reconsider the doctrine and, especially, its requirement that plaintiffs find clearly
established law.
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INTRODUCTION
In Greek myths, heroes are regularly sent off on extraordinary quests. King Pelias ordered Jason and the Argonauts to
bring back the fleece of the golden-haired, winged ram so that Jason could claim the throne of Iolcus in Thessaly.1 Hercules, cursed
by Hera, and enslaved by Eurystheus, was ordered to perform
1
See generally EDITH HAMILTON, The Quest of the Golden Fleece, in MYTHOLOGY
117 (New American Library ed. 1953) (1942).
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twelve labors—several of which required him to capture creatures
that desperately did not want to get got, including the wild boar
of Mount Erymanthus, the mad bull that terrorized the island of
Crete, the man-eating mares of King Diomedes, the cattle of the
three-bodied giant Geryon, and the triple-headed dog, Cerberus,
from the underworld.2
The Supreme Court’s qualified immunity doctrine sends
plaintiffs off on similarly far-flung pursuits. Qualified immunity
shields government officials from damages liability—even when
they have violated the law—so long as the right was not “clearly
established.”3 The Court has said that, except in extraordinary
circumstances, the law is clearly established only if a prior case
has declared the conduct unconstitutional.4 And that prior case
must have facts that map neatly onto the facts of the plaintiff’s
case.5 The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that it is
not enough simply to point to Graham v. Connor6 and Tennessee
v. Garner7—two Supreme Court cases that set out frameworks for
assessing the constitutionality of uses of force—to show it was
clearly established that a law enforcement officer’s use of force
was unconstitutional. Instead, the plaintiff must produce a case
in which another law enforcement officer used a similar type and
degree of force under similar circumstances, and was held to have
violated the Constitution.8
To find a factually similar case is a challenge on its own—
particularly given the unending number of ways government

2

See generally EDITH HAMILTON, Hercules, in MYTHOLOGY, supra note 1, at 159.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
4
Although the Court held, in Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739–45 (2002), and again
in Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 54 (2020), that a prior court decision is not necessary to
clearly establish the law when the constitutional violation is “obvious,” the Court has interpreted this exception narrowly. See infra notes 34–38 and accompanying text.
5
See infra notes 42–51 and accompanying text.
6
490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989) (holding that Fourth Amendment excessive force
claims turn on whether the officer’s conduct was “‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the
facts and circumstances confronting them,” taking into consideration “the severity of the
crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers
or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by
flight”).
7
471 U.S. 1, 3, 11–12 (1985) (holding that deadly force could not be used against
“an apparently unarmed suspected felon . . . unless it is necessary to prevent the escape
and the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of
death or serious physical injury to the officer or others”).
8
See infra notes 47–56 and accompanying text (describing Supreme Court cases
setting out this requirement).
3
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officials can violate people’s constitutional rights. But the Supreme Court has made the search for clearly established law even
more formidable by allowing lower courts to grant qualified immunity without ruling on the merits of plaintiffs’ claims.9 As Fifth
Circuit Judge Don Willett put it: “No precedent = no clearly established law = no liability. An Escherian Stairwell. Heads defendants win, tails plaintiffs lose.”10 King Eurystheus couldn’t
have divined a better riddle.
The Supreme Court’s qualified immunity doctrine has been
criticized six ways from Sunday—for bearing no resemblance to
common law protections in effect when 42 U.S.C. § 1983 became
law, undermining government accountability, and failing to
achieve the doctrine’s intended policy goals.11 The Court’s definition of “clearly established law” has also received its fair share of
criticism. Commentators have argued that the Court’s decisions
have provided unclear and shifting guidance about how factually
similar a case must be to clearly establish the law and which
courts’ decisions can clearly establish the law.12 Commentators
have also argued that the “clearly established” standard protects
officers who have outrageously abused their power simply because no prior decision has declared that conduct unlawful.13 As
Professor John Jeffries has observed, the existence of precedent
is not a good indicator of the wrongfulness of conduct, and truly
awful conduct can be shielded from liability so long as no court
has previously declared that conduct unconstitutional.14 “It is,”

9

See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 227 (2009).
Zadeh v. Robinson, 902 F.3d 483, 499 (5th Cir. 2018) (Willett, J., concurring
dubitante).
11 See generally Joanna C. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, 93
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1797 (2018) (describing these critiques); see also infra notes 244–46
and accompanying text (same).
12 See, e.g., Karen Blum, Erwin Chemerinsky & Martin A. Schwartz, Qualified Immunity Developments: Not Much Hope Left for Plaintiffs, 29 TOURO L. REV. 633, 653–56
(2013) (describing shifting standards for clearly established law); Alan K. Chen, The Intractability of Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1937, 1948–51 (2018) (describing confusion about how factually analogous prior court decisions must be to clearly establish the law); John C. Jeffries, Jr., What’s Wrong with Qualified Immunity?, 62 FLA. L.
REV. 851, 854–59 (2010) (describing confusion about which sources can clearly establish
the law and how factually analogous prior cases must be to clearly establish the law).
13 See Jeffries, supra note 12, at 854–58, 863–66; John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability
Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. REV. 207, 256–58 (2013); see also Michael L. Wells,
Qualified Immunity After Ziglar v. Abbasi: The Case for a Categorical Approach, 68 AM.
U. L. REV. 379, 436–38 (2019).
14 Jeffries, supra note 13, at 255–56.
10
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Jeffries writes, “as if the one-bite rule for bad dogs started over
with every change in weather conditions.”15
In this Article, I offer another reason that the “clearly established” standard is fundamentally flawed—it misunderstands the
ways in which officers are educated about the scope of their constitutional authority. Qualified immunity’s requirement that
plaintiffs produce clearly established law is intended to shield
government officials from damages liability unless they had “fair
warning”16 or “fair notice”17 of the unlawfulness of their conduct.
The Court has instructed lower courts that watershed constitutional decisions like Graham and Garner do not provide officers
with adequate warning or notice about the limits of their authority.18 Instead, the Court’s qualified immunity decisions explain,
officers have fair warning that their conduct is unconstitutional
only if a court previously held that factually similar conduct exceeded constitutional bounds.19 By holding that only factually
similar precedent can put officers on notice of the unconstitutionality of their conduct—thereby clearly establishing the law—the
Court appears to assume that officers are educated not only about
watershed decisions like Graham and Garner, but also about the
lower court decisions that apply Graham and Garner to a multitude of factual scenarios.20
Nowhere in the Court’s decisions is consideration given to
how, exactly, police officers are expected to learn about the facts
and holdings of the hundreds—if not thousands—of Supreme
Court, circuit court, and district court opinions that could be used
to clearly establish the law for qualified immunity purposes. Sustained consideration of this question is also absent from scholarly
commentary, although some have made mention of the implausibility of the Court’s assumption that officers know about these
court decisions.21 Nor has much consideration been given to the
likelihood that police officers recall the facts and holdings of these
15

Id. at 256.
Hope, 536 U.S. at 740–41.
17 Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004).
18 See infra notes 47–52 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 52–65 and accompanying text.
20 See infra Part I.B.
21 See, e.g., John F. Preis, Qualified Immunity and Fault, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1969, 1971 (2018) (“Appellate opinions are, not surprisingly, rarely read by government
officers and, even when their substance is communicated to officers, they only comprise
one of many factors that affect the blameworthiness of an officer.”).
16
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hundreds or thousands of cases as they are making split-second
decisions about whether to stop and frisk someone, search a car,
or shoot their gun.22
In this Article, I show that—in addition to its many other
flaws—the Supreme Court’s qualified immunity doctrine does not
accurately reflect how officers are educated about court opinions
or the role these opinions play in officers’ decisionmaking. I have
examined hundreds of use-of-force policies, trainings, and other
educational materials received by California law enforcement officers.23 I find that police departments regularly inform their officers about watershed decisions like Graham and Garner. But
officers are not regularly or reliably informed about court decisions interpreting those decisions in different factual scenarios—
the very types of decisions that are necessary to clearly establish
the law about the constitutionality of uses of force.
California police department policy manuals reference or incorporate the constitutional standards from Graham and Garner,
but rarely reference any cases in which Graham and Garner were
applied.24 California police officer trainings similarly focus primarily on the broad principles articulated in Graham and Garner.25 More than three-fourths of the 329 training outlines I reviewed referenced no court decision applying Graham and/or
Garner. Even when training outlines do reference such cases, the
outlines suggest that trainers do not educate officers about their
facts and holdings. Instead, these cases are introduced for broad
principles that build on Graham and Garner: the notion, for example, that an officer does not need to use the least force possible,
so long as the force used was reasonable.26 Trainings do, regularly, incorporate hypotheticals as a way to help officers develop
an understanding about whether force is appropriate in various

22 For one notable exception, see Manzanares v. Roosevelt Cnty. Adult Det. Ctr., 331
F. Supp. 3d 1260, 1293 n.10 (D.N.M. 2018) (“It strains credulity to believe that a reasonable officer, as he is approaching a suspect to arrest, is thinking to himself: ‘Are the facts
here anything like the facts in York v. City of Las Cruces?’”).
23 For discussion of my reasons for focusing on use-of-force decisions, see infra notes
128–31 and accompanying text. For discussion of my reasons for focusing on California
officers, see infra notes 118–21 and accompanying text.
24 For further discussion of these findings, see infra Part III.B.
25 For further discussion of these findings, see infra Part III.C.
26 See infra notes 148–69 and accompanying text (discussing training outlines that
use Ninth Circuit cases to illustrate this point).
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scenarios. But the outlines offer no indication that these scenarios
are drawn from court cases.
Police officers are not reliably learning about use-of-force
cases applying Garner and Graham from other sources, either.27
District attorneys and city attorneys do not appear to train officers about the facts and holdings of court decisions that clearly establish the law for qualified immunity purposes. There are a
handful of e-mail newsletters available to law enforcement officers that describe court decisions relevant to law enforcement. But
even these newsletters provide scattershot information about
use-of-force cases, and there is no requirement that California officers subscribe to and read them. In sum, California police officers are not regularly or reliably given warning or fair notice of the
facts and holdings of court decisions that apply Graham and
Garner.
Moreover, even if law enforcement relied more heavily on
court decisions to educate their officers about the constitutional
limits of force, the expectations of notice and reliance baked into
qualified immunity doctrine would still be unrealistic. There
could never be sufficient time to train officers about the hundreds—if not thousands—of court cases that could clearly establish the law for qualified immunity purposes. Moreover, even if
an officer did somehow come to learn about the facts and holdings
of court decisions applying Graham and Garner, there is no reason to believe that an officer would think about those cases during
the types of high-speed, high-stress interactions that often lead to
uses of force.28 At best, court decisions are one of many sources of
information that officers have about the limits of appropriate behavior. And all available evidence suggests that people cannot
sort through the complex information contained in court decisions
in the types of high-pressure circumstances that often precede police uses of force.
Qualified immunity doctrine is, rightfully, being attacked
from all sides. When the Court or Congress does finally reconsider
qualified immunity, it should keep this Article’s findings in
mind.29 And, until Congress or the Supreme Court takes action,
27

See infra Part III.C–D.
For further discussion, see infra Part IV.
29 States should also keep these findings in mind, as state legislatures consider
whether to enact causes of action that do not allow a qualified immunity defense, and state
courts consider whether qualified immunity applies to existing state law causes of action.
28
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lower courts should remember, when considering qualified immunity motions, that officers are not given notice of the cases that
defendants argue are necessary to clearly establish the law. Police officers are put on notice of the Supreme Court’s watershed
decisions—like Graham and Garner—but not about the circuit
and district court opinions that apply those decisions. It therefore
makes no sense to require plaintiffs to plumb the depths of
Westlaw for factually similar lower court decisions as proof that
officers were on notice of the unconstitutionality of their conduct.
Requiring plaintiffs to find factually similar cases sends them on
extraordinary journeys comparable to heroes’ quests, but does not
advance the stated goals of qualified immunity.
The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes qualified immunity and the expectation embedded in the
doctrine that officers know about the decisions that apply watershed cases like Graham and Garner to various factual scenarios.
Part II offers an overview of the landscape of clearly established
law in one area: Ninth Circuit Fourth Amendment excessive force
cases interpreting Graham and Garner. As this Part shows, there
are hundreds of cases interpreting the scope of constitutional
rights in this one area, in this one circuit, suggesting that there
could be thousands of cases that clearly establish the law regarding the constitutional bounds of California officers’ conduct. Yet,
as I show in Part III, the facts and holdings of these cases interpreting Graham and Garner play virtually no role in California
police policies, trainings, and other educational materials. Moreover, as I show in Part IV, the expectations of notice upon which
qualified immunity doctrine relies would not be met even if officers were better educated about these cases. Officers could never
learn the facts and holdings of the hundreds or thousands of cases
that clearly establish the law and, even if they learned about some
of these cases, they would not reliably recall their facts and holdings while doing their jobs. Finally, in Part V, I consider the implications of these findings for the future of qualified immunity.

See, e.g., Nick Sibilla, Colorado Passes Landmark Law Against Qualified Immunity, Creates New Way to Protect Civil Rights, FORBES (June 21, 2020), https://perma.cc/5UKR
-CZM4 (describing a Colorado law that creates a new “civil action for deprivation of rights”
and states that “qualified immunity is not a defense to liability,” as well as court decisions
that have limited qualified immunity’s applicability to state law claims (quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Enhance Law Enforcement Integrity Act, S.B. 20-217, 72d Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2020))).
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I. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY’S EXPECTATION THAT OFFICERS KNOW
“CLEARLY ESTABLISHED LAW”
Qualified immunity doctrine did not always require that
plaintiffs identify circuit court or Supreme Court decisions with
virtually identical facts before allowing them to recover. In this
Part, I describe the evolution of qualified immunity doctrine from
its inception to the present day, then describe two key assumptions underlying the doctrine: that officers know about Supreme
Court and courts of appeals decisions applying broad constitutional principles set out in cases like Graham and Garner to various factual scenarios, and that officers recall and rely on the facts
and holdings of those decisions while on the job.
A. The Evolution of Qualified Immunity
In 1967, when the Supreme Court created the qualified immunity defense, it shielded officers from damages liability if they
were acting in “good faith.”30 But today’s qualified immunity doctrine has nothing to do with officers’ good faith. In 1982, in a case
called Harlow v. Fitzgerald,31 the Court eliminated consideration
of an officer’s subjective intent, and instead instructed lower
courts to grant officers qualified immunity if their conduct did not
violate “clearly established law.”32 Current Supreme Court doctrine suggests that an officer violates clearly established law only
if there is a prior court of appeals or Supreme Court decision holding virtually identical facts to be unconstitutional.33 In this Section, I explain how the Court’s definition of “clearly established
law” has evolved from 1982 to the present day, both in terms of
what sources can clearly establish the law and how factually similar prior court decisions must be to the case at hand.
The Court has offered shifting guidance about whether a
court decision is necessary to clearly establish the law. In 2002,
the Court held, in Hope v. Pelzer,34 that a prior court opinion with
similar facts was unnecessary to clearly establish that it was unconstitutional for prison guards to punish a prisoner by shackling

30
31
32
33
34

Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967).
457 U.S. 800 (1982).
Id. at 818.
See infra notes 42–56 and accompanying text.
536 U.S. 730 (2002).
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him to a hitching post for seven hours under the Alabama sun.35
In 2020, the Court, in Taylor v. Riojas,36 ruled that a prior court
opinion with similar facts was unnecessary to clearly establish
that it was unconstitutional to confine a prisoner for six days in
“shockingly unsanitary cells” covered in feces and sewage.37 But—
beyond these two decisions involving the torturous treatment of
state prisoners—the Court’s decisions have paid only lip service
to the notion that constitutional rights can be clearly established
without a prior case on point and have repeatedly required that
plaintiffs identify court decisions to overcome a qualified immunity motion.38
The Court has also offered shifting guidance about which
courts can clearly establish the law. In 1999, the Court explained
that a plaintiff must identify a case of “controlling authority in
their jurisdiction at the time of the incident” or a “consensus of
cases of persuasive authority” to defeat a qualified immunity motion.39 In recent years, however, the Court has hinted—in opinions that only “[a]ssum[e] arguendo” that a decision by a court
other than the Supreme Court can clearly establish the law—that
not even courts of appeals cases will reliably do the trick.40
Although neither the Supreme Court nor lower courts have
35

Id. at 738–46.
141 S. Ct. 52 (2020).
37 Id. at 53.
38 Beyond the Court’s decision in Riojas, and a citation to Hope when describing the
qualified immunity standard in Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014), the Court’s invocations of Hope’s language have been in dissent. See, e.g., Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct.
1148, 1158 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[O]fficials can still be on notice that their
conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances.” (citing Hope, 536
U.S. at 741)); Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 314 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(“This Court has rejected the idea that ‘an official action is protected by qualified immunity
unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful.’ Instead, the crux of
the qualified immunity test is whether officers have ‘fair notice’ that they are acting unconstitutionally.” (first quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987); and then
quoting Hope, 536 U.S. at 739)).
39 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999).
40 Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 665 (2012); see also, e.g., Carroll v. Carman, 135
S. Ct. 348, 350 (2014) (“Assuming for the sake of argument that a controlling circuit precedent could constitute clearly established federal law in these circumstances, Marasco
does not clearly establish that Carroll violated the Carmans’ Fourth Amendment rights.”
(citation omitted)); City & County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1776
(2015) (“[E]ven if ‘a controlling circuit precedent could constitute clearly established federal law in these circumstances,’ it does not do so here.” (citation omitted) (quoting Carroll,
135 S. Ct. at 350)); City of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500, 503 (2019) (“Assuming
without deciding that a court of appeals decision may constitute clearly established law
for purposes of qualified immunity . . . .”).
36
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limited their qualified immunity analyses to Supreme Court decisions, the Court’s musings about which courts can clearly establish the law have created uncertainty on this point.41
The Court has also gotten stricter about how factually analogous prior precedent must be in order to clearly establish the law.
In 1999, the Court explained that law was clearly established if it
was “sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.”42 But then, in
2011, in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,43 the Court substituted “every” for
“a,” such that “every ‘reasonable official’” would now need to understand that their conduct violates the law.44 Although the Court
has repeatedly assured plaintiffs that it “do[es] not require a case
directly on point,” it has also repeatedly instructed lower courts
“not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality”
when considering a qualified immunity motion.45 “The dispositive
question,” the Court has written, “is ‘whether the violative nature
of particular conduct is clearly established’” and “[t]his inquiry
‘must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not
as a broad general proposition.’”46
In the use-of-force context, this has come to mean that, in the
Supreme Court’s words, “Garner and Graham do not by themselves create clearly established law outside ‘an obvious case.’”47
For example, the Supreme Court made clear in Brosseau v.
Haugen48 that it was not enough to ask whether it was clearly
established that a police officer may use deadly force only
“[w]here the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect
poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to
others.”49 Instead, the correct inquiry, according to the Court, is

41 See, e.g., Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court’s Quiet Expansion of Qualified Immunity, 100 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 62, 70–71 (2016) (describing these decisions and resulting uncertainty about which courts’ decisions can clearly establish the law).
42 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
43 563 U.S. 731 (2011).
44 Id. at 741 (emphasis added) (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640).
45 Id. at 741–42.
46 Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308 (emphasis in original) (quotation marks omitted) (first
quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742; and then quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198
(2004)).
47 White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017) (citing Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S.
194, 199 (2004)).
48 543 U.S. 194 (2004).
49 Id. at 203 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Garner, 471
U.S. at 11).

616

The University of Chicago Law Review

[88:605

whether clearly established law prohibited the officer’s conduct
under the “‘situation [ ] confronted’: whether to shoot a disturbed
felon, set on avoiding capture through vehicular flight, when persons in the immediate area are at risk from that flight.”50 The
Court concluded in Brosseau that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity because none of the circuit cases cited by the
plaintiff “squarely govern[ed]” the facts of the case.51
In recent years, the Court has reversed a spate of qualified
immunity denials, and repeatedly criticized lower courts for not
fully appreciating how factually similar prior cases must be to
clearly establish the law.52 For example, in White v. Pauly,53 the
Court observed that it had, over the past five years, “issued a
number of opinions reversing federal courts in qualified immunity cases,” and that it was “again necessary to reiterate the
longstanding principle that ‘clearly established law’ should not be
defined ‘at a high level of generality.’” 54 The Court criticized the
Tenth Circuit for misunderstanding the qualified immunity
analysis and relying on “Graham, Garner, and their Court of Appeals progeny, which . . . lay out excessive-force principles at only
a general level,”55 and reversed the circuit court’s decision denying
the officer qualified immunity because “[c]learly established federal law does not prohibit a reasonable officer who arrives late to
an ongoing police action in circumstances like [those in the case]
from assuming that proper procedures, such as officer identification, have already been followed.”56

50

Id. at 199–200 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001)).
Id. at 201.
52 See, e.g., White, 137 S. Ct. at 552 (“[W]e have held that Garner and Graham do not
by themselves create clearly established law outside ‘an obvious case.’” (quoting Brosseau,
543 U.S. at 199)); Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1775–76 (“Graham holds only that the ‘objective
reasonableness’ test applies to excessive-force claims under the Fourth Amendment. That
is far too general a proposition to control this case.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)
(quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 388)); Emmons, 139 S. Ct. at 503 (quoting Emmons v. City
of Escondido, 716 F. App’x 724, 726 (9th Cir. 2018)):
51

The Court of Appeals should have asked whether clearly established law prohibited the officers from stopping and taking down a man in these circumstances.
Instead, the Court of Appeals defined the clearly established right at a high level
of generality by saying only that the “right to be free of excessive force” was
clearly established.
53
54
55
56

137 S. Ct. 548 (2017).
Id. at 551–52 (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742).
Id. at 552.
Id.
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Lower courts appear to have gotten the message.57 Recent circuit courts’ qualified immunity decisions have repeatedly invoked
the Supreme Court’s instruction that clearly established law
should not be defined “at a high level of generality” when assessing officers’ entitlement to qualified immunity.58 And circuit
courts have granted officers qualified immunity even when prior
precedent held that almost identical conduct was unconstitutional. For example, in Baxter v. Bracey,59 the Sixth Circuit
granted qualified immunity to officers who released their police
dog on a burglary suspect who was sitting down with his hands
up.60 Although a prior Sixth Circuit decision had held that it was
unconstitutional to release a police dog on a suspect who was lying down, the Sixth Circuit granted qualified immunity because,
it held, that decision did not clearly establish the
57 See Manzanares v. Roosevelt Cnty. Adult Det. Ctr., 331 F. Supp. 3d 1260, 1293–
94 n.10 (D.N.M. 2018) (citation omitted):

Although still stating that there might be an obvious case under Graham that
would make the law clearly established without a Supreme Court or Circuit
Court case on point, the Supreme Court has sent unwritten signals to the lower
courts that a factually identical or a highly similar factual case is required for
the law to be clearly established, and the Tenth Circuit is now sending these
unwritten signals to the district courts.
58 S.B. v. County of San Diego, 864 F.3d 1010, 1015 (9th Cir. 2017) (first citing
Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1775–76; and then citing White, 137 S. Ct. at 552); see also, e.g.,
Isayeva v. Sacramento Sheriff’s Dep’t, 872 F.3d 938, 947 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[G]eneral standards [like those in Graham] are only the starting point [when assessing whether the law
is clearly established]. The dispositive question is ‘whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established.’ This question must be answered ‘not as a broad general proposition,’ but with reference to the facts of specific cases.” (emphasis in original)
(citation omitted) (quoting Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308)); McCoy v. Alamu, 950 F.3d 226,
233 n.8 (5th Cir. 2020) (finding a constitutional violation but granting qualified immunity,
noting that “[s]ome might find this a puzzling result,” but explaining that “[t]he Supreme
Court has repeatedly reversed courts of appeals for failing to define established law narrowly, and we must follow that binding precedent”); Francis v. Fiacco, 942 F.3d 126, 145–
46 (2d Cir. 2019) (finding a constitutional violation but granting qualified immunity, observing that “the Supreme Court has ‘repeatedly told courts . . . not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality,’ instead emphasizing that ‘clearly established
law must be “particularized” to the facts of the case’” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (first quoting Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1775–76; then quoting White, 137 S. Ct. at 552));
Garcia v. Escalante, 678 F. App’x. 649, 654–60 (10th Cir. 2017) (noting the Supreme
Court’s repeated admonitions to lower courts that they define clearly established law narrowly, observing that the Tenth Circuit was “recently faulted” by the Court for “fail[ing]
to identify a case where an officer acting under similar circumstances . . . was held to have
violated the Fourth Amendment,” and granting qualified immunity (alterations in original) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting White, 137 S. Ct. at 552)).
59 751 F. App’x 869 (6th Cir. 2018).
60 See id. at 871–72.
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unconstitutionality of the officers’ decision to release a police dog
on a person who was seated with their hands in the air.61
In another case, Kelsay v. Ernst,62 the Eighth Circuit held
that an officer who slammed a woman to the ground—breaking
her collarbone and knocking her unconscious—was entitled to
qualified immunity.63 Prior Eighth Circuit cases had held that,
“where a nonviolent misdemeanant poses no threat to officers and
is not actively resisting arrest or attempting to flee, an officer may
not employ force just because the suspect is interfering with police or behaving disrespectfully.”64 But, the Eighth Circuit held,
the officer was entitled to qualified immunity because this precedent did not clearly establish that “a deputy was forbidden to use
a takedown maneuver to arrest a suspect who ignored the deputy’s instruction to ‘get back here’ and continued to walk away
from the officer.”65
B. Officers’ Assumed Notice of and Reliance on Clearly
Established Law
The Supreme Court’s demand that there be prior factually
analogous circuit court precedent to clearly establish the law is
not simply a way of making it more difficult to sue government
officers.66 Instead, this requirement is explicitly tied to an assumption that officers know about these court decisions and rely
on them when doing their jobs.67 As the Court explained in Harlow, qualified immunity shields government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.”68 In Anderson v.
Creighton,69 the Court explained that the protections of qualified
61

See id.
933 F.3d 975 (8th Cir. 2019).
63 Id. at 980–82.
64 Id. at 980.
65 Id.
66 That may, however, be part of the Court’s motivation. As the Court has written, if
the law could be clearly established at a high level of generality, “[p]laintiffs would be able
to convert the rule of qualified immunity . . . into a rule of virtually unqualified liability
simply by alleging violation of extremely abstract rights.” Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639.
67 See, e.g., Fred O. Smith, Jr., Formalism, Ferguson, and the Future of Qualified
Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2093, 2103 (2018) (explaining that qualified immunity
doctrine “relies on principles of notice”).
68 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (emphasis added).
69 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
62
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immunity are “intended to provide government officials with the
ability ‘reasonably [to] anticipate when their conduct may give
rise to liability for damages.’” 70 And the Court explained, in
Brosseau: “Because the focus is on whether the officer had fair
notice that her conduct was unlawful, reasonableness is judged
against the backdrop of the law at the time of the conduct.”71
The Court does not appear to be referring to constructive notice here; instead, its decisions articulate an expectation that
qualified immunity actually causes government officials to assess, before acting, whether prior court decisions clearly establish
that their conduct would violate the Constitution. In Mitchell v.
Forsyth,72 the Court wrote that the limited protections of qualified
immunity meant the U.S. Attorney General “may on occasion
have to pause to consider whether a proposed course of action can
be squared with the Constitution and laws of the United States.”73
That pause was, the Court explained, “precisely the point of the
Harlow standard: ‘Where an official could be expected to know
that his conduct would violate statutory or constitutional rights,
he should be made to hesitate . . . .’”74 The Attorney General,
when deciding to take some national security measure, would presumably have sufficient time to research—or have someone else
research—the constitutionality of possible courses of action. But
the Supreme Court also appears to assume that police officers will
pause to consider the facts and holdings of prior court decisions
when making split-second decisions on the job.
In fact, the Supreme Court has written that the factual variation associated with cases involving the Fourth Amendment
makes it especially important that there be a prior case on point—
so that the officer would know how the law applies to the circumstances at hand. For example, in Kisela v. Hughes,75 the Court
explained, when instructing lower courts “not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality”:76

70 Id. at 646 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Davis v. Scherer, 468
U.S. 183, 195 (1984)).
71 Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 198 (emphasis added).
72 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
73 Id. at 524.
74 Id. (emphasis and alteration in original) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819).
75 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018).
76 Id. at 1152 (citing Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1775–76).
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“[S]pecificity is especially important in the Fourth Amendment context, where the Court has recognized that it is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant
legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the factual
situation the officer confronts.” Use of excessive force is an
area of the law “in which the result depends very much on
the facts of each case,” and thus police officers are entitled to
qualified immunity unless existing precedent “squarely governs” the specific facts at issue. Precedent involving similar
facts can help move a case beyond the otherwise “hazy border
between excessive and acceptable force” and thereby provide
an officer notice that a specific use of force is unlawful.77
Note what the Court’s statement presumes about police officers’ knowledge of court decisions applying Graham and Garner
and consideration of those decisions when on the job: the Court
writes that factually similar precedent is important to clearly establish the law because “it is sometimes difficult for an officer to
determine how the relevant legal doctrine . . . will apply to the
factual situation the officer confronts,”78 and that “[p]recedent involving similar facts can . . . provide an officer notice that a specific use of force is unlawful.”79 In other recent qualified immunity
decisions concerning police officers’ Fourth Amendment powers,
the Court has used almost identical language to press home the
point.80
77 Id. at 1152–53 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Mullenix, 136 S.
Ct. at 308–09, 312).
78 Id. at 1152 (quoting Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308).
79 Id. at 1153 (emphasis added).
80 See, e.g., Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308 (explaining that factually specific precedent
is necessary to clearly establish the law, and “[s]uch specificity is especially important in
the Fourth Amendment context, where the Court has recognized that ‘[i]t is sometimes
difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force,
will apply to the factual situation the officer confronts.’” (alteration in original) (quoting
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205)); District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 590 (2018) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (first quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1866
(2017); and then quoting White, 137 S. Ct. at 552):

Given its imprecise nature, officers will often find it difficult to know how the
general standard of probable cause applies in “the precise situation encountered.” Thus, we have stressed the need to “identify a case where an officer acting
under similar circumstances . . . was held to have violated the Fourth Amendment.”
See also Emmons, 139 S. Ct. at 503 (“Specificity is especially important in the Fourth
Amendment context, where the Court has recognized that it is sometimes difficult for an
officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine . . . will apply to the factual situation
the officer confronts.” (quoting Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1153)). The Court has also expressed
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Lower courts appear to have embraced the notion that officers are notified of the substance and holdings of court opinions
and rely on those decisions before taking action. 81 Take, for
example, Bryan v. United States,82 in which the Third Circuit
granted qualified immunity to Customs and Border Inspection officers who had searched a cruise ship cabin.83 Although the Third
Circuit had ruled on the constitutionality of such searches in an
almost identical case a few days before the searches at issue took
place, the court held that its decision did not clearly establish the
law because “it is beyond belief that within two days the government could determine . . . what new policy was required to conform to the ruling, much less communicate that new policy to the
CBP officers.”84 The Third Circuit’s decision not only expects that
government officials are educated about court decisions clearly
establishing the law in various contexts, but also shields officers
from liability because superiors would not have trained officers
about a relevant decision in just a few days.
its belief that police officers are knowledgeable about circuit court decisions regarding the
scope of the Fourth Amendment in the exclusionary rule context. See Davis v. United
States, 564 U.S. 229, 241 (2011) (alteration, quotation marks and citation omitted) (first
quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 599 (2006); and then quoting United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920 (1984)):
Responsible law enforcement officers will take care to learn “what is required of
them” under Fourth Amendment precedent and will conform their conduct to
these rules. . . . An officer who conducts a search in reliance on binding appellate
precedent does no more than “act as a reasonable officer would and should act”
under the circumstances.
81 See, e.g., Corbitt v. Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304, 1311–12 (11th Cir. 2019) (explaining
that a right is clearly established for qualified immunity purposes only if a prior factually
similar case so held “because ‘officials are not obligated to be creative or imaginative in
drawing analogies from previously decided cases,’ and an ‘official’s awareness of the
existence of an abstract right . . . does not equate to knowledge that his conduct infringes
the right’” (alteration and emphasis in original) (quoting Coffin v. Brandau, 642 F.3d 999,
1015 (11th Cir. 2011))); Hedgpeth v. Rahim, 893 F.3d 802, 809 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (explaining
that the “pertinent question” for the qualified immunity analysis “is whether ‘any competent officer,’ in light of ‘[p]recedent involving similar facts,’ would consider it unlawful to
use a takedown maneuver” under the circumstances in the case (alteration in original)
(citation omitted) (quoting Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1153)); Mason-Funk v. City of Neenah, 895
F.3d 504, 508, 510 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Kisela in support of the proposition that “police
officers are entitled to qualified immunity unless existing precedent squarely governs the
specific facts at issue” and finding that “the facts in this case and existing precedent failed
to put Officers Hoffer and Ross on notice that their use of deadly force . . . was unlawful.”
(quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1153)).
82 913 F.3d 356 (3d Cir. 2019).
83 Id. at 363.
84 Id.
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It follows from the Bryan court’s rationale—and the rationale
in recent Supreme Court decisions like Kisela—that officers will
learn of the facts and holdings of court decisions that clearly establish the law given sufficient time, and will rely on those decisions on the job. But, as I show in the next Part, for this to be true,
officers would need to learn of hundreds or even thousands of
court decisions that might clearly establish the law in various
contexts.
II. “CLEARLY ESTABLISHED LAW” ON POLICE USE OF FORCE
The Supreme Court’s qualified immunity doctrine relies on
the assumption that officers are educated not only about watershed decisions like Graham and Garner but also about decisions
applying Graham and Garner to various factual scenarios. The
Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence also appears to expect
that officers consider these court decisions when deciding
whether and how to take action. Before describing the role these
types of decisions actually play in California police departments’
use-of-force policies and trainings as well as officers’ decisions on
the street, it is worth considering the number and range of court
decisions that officers would need to know about if these assumptions underlying qualified immunity were accurate.
In this Part, I offer an overview of just one subgroup of decisions that might clearly establish the law for California officers—
decisions from the Ninth Circuit interpreting Graham and Garner in the context of Fourth Amendment excessive force cases.85
This overview does not reflect all use-of-force cases that could
clearly establish the law for California officers; the Ninth Circuit
has held that decisions issued by other circuits and district courts
can also clearly establish the law.86 In addition, these decisions
represent only a fraction of the total cases that could clearly establish the law for California officers because they do not address
the constitutionality of other types of police behaviors—searches,
arrests, surveillance, and the like. But even this subset of cases
85 For further discussion of my decision to focus on use-of-force cases, see infra notes
128–31 and accompanying text.
86 See Prison Legal News v. Lehman, 397 F.3d 692, 701–02 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that the Ninth Circuit will “look at unpublished decisions and the law of other circuits,
in addition to Ninth Circuit precedent” when determining whether the law is clearly established); Sorrels v. McKee, 290 F.3d 965, 971 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[U]npublished decisions
of district courts may inform our qualified immunity analysis.”).
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indicates the vast body of law about which qualified immunity
doctrine assumes officers are aware.
As of July 10, 2020, I found 284 Supreme Court and Ninth
Circuit decisions on Westlaw applying Graham and/or Garner to
a use-of-force incident and articulating one or more holdings regarding the constitutionality of defendants’ alleged conduct.87 Of
those 284 cases, 7 are Supreme Court decisions and 277 are Ninth
Circuit decisions. Among the 277 Ninth Circuit decisions, 171 are
unpublished and 106 are published. Although this distinction
matters in some circuits, it does not in the Ninth: the Ninth Circuit has regularly stated that unpublished decisions from circuit
and district courts can clearly establish the law.88
The manner in which these Ninth Circuit decisions clearly
establish the law depends in some part on the procedural posture
87 On Westlaw, I used the “citing references” function to find the 595 Supreme Court
and Ninth Circuit decisions that cite Graham, and the 247 Supreme Court and Ninth
Circuit decisions that cite Garner. There were, unsurprisingly, a significant number of
cases citing both Graham and Garner, and so after removing duplicate case references,
this Westlaw search captured a total of 55 Supreme Court and 554 Ninth Circuit decisions
that cited Graham and/or Garner since Garner. I read and hand-coded each of these 609
decisions, but excluded more than half of these cases from the dataset for various reasons.
First, I excluded from my dataset decisions that cite Graham or Garner but are focused on
other issues—jury instructions, for example—and so do not analyze the applicability of
Graham and Garner to the facts of the case and do not explicate clearly established law
about the use of force. I also omitted court decisions that are too vague about the facts
underlying the case to clearly establish the law as that phrase is defined by the Court.
Finally, because my focus is on Ninth Circuit decisions that would clearly establish the
law for § 1983 excessive force cases brought under the Fourth Amendment against law
enforcement officers, I omitted cases that concern substantive due process claims and
claims against prison officials. For a description of these 284 decisions, see the Supreme
Court and Ninth Circuit Use of Force Decisions Appendix [hereinafter Appendix], available at https://perma.cc/5BQR-AFEQ.
88 In 2005, the Ninth Circuit explained that, when assessing whether the defendant
violated clearly established law, it could “look at unpublished decisions and the law of
other circuits, in addition to Ninth Circuit precedent.” Prison Legal News, 397 F.3d at 702;
see also Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752, 775 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that “unpublished opinions ‘can be considered in determining whether the law was clearly established’” (quoting Bahrampour v. Lampert, 356 F.3d 969, 977 (9th Cir. 2004)). Note,
though, that the Ninth Circuit has cautioned that “it will be a rare instance in which,
absent any published opinions on point or overwhelming obviousness of illegality, we can
conclude that the law was clearly established on the basis of unpublished decisions only.”
Hines v. Youseff, 914 F.3d 1218, 1230 (9th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Sorrels, 290 F.3d at 971). Although circuits vary in whether and to what extent unpublished decisions can clearly establish the law, at least six appear to rely on unpublished
decisions to some degree. See generally David R. Cleveland, Clear as Mud: How the Uncertain Precedential Status of Unpublished Opinions Muddles Qualified Immunity Determinations, 65 U. MIA. L. REV. 45 (2015) (surveying circuits’ treatment of unpublished decisions in their qualified immunity analyses).
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of the cases. The vast majority of decisions are appeals of lower
court summary judgment decisions, although some are appeals of
decisions on motions to dismiss or judgments as a matter of law.
Some decisions—particularly appeals of judgments as a matter of
law during or after trial—rule on whether the evidence presented
by the parties supported a jury’s conclusions about the constitutionality of officers’ conduct. Decisions on summary judgment motions may find that no reasonable jury could find officers violated
the Constitution, or may find a material factual dispute such that
the plaintiff’s version of facts would establish a constitutional violation and defendant’s version of facts would establish no violation. Regardless of the procedural posture and form of the ruling,
each type of decision could be used to clearly establish the law for
qualified immunity purposes—and many of these 284 decisions
have been cited in other qualified immunity decisions for just this
purpose.89
These 284 Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit decisions explicate the constitutionality of various types of force—punching,
handcuffs, batons, pepper spray, tasers, shootings, and more—
under a whole range of circumstances.90 Shooting cases are the
most common, representing 108 (38%) of all 284 Ninth Circuit
and Supreme Court use-of-force decisions. Other common types of
force adjudicated in these decisions are uses of force without
weapons (91 decisions), pointing guns (21 decisions), tasers (18
decisions), handcuffs (27 decisions), pepper spray (18 decisions),
and police dogs (13 decisions). Within these broad categories,
there are clusters of cases involving similar applications of the
same type of force. For example, in 10 of the 108 decisions involving shootings, officers shot at people in cars. In 6 of the 91 decisions involving force without a weapon, officers used chokeholds
or control holds. There are also clusters of cases involving similar
circumstances in which force was used. For example, several
cases involve tasers during stops of motorists, and several cases
involve officers’ decisions to handcuff residents during searches of
their homes. There are also clusters of cases in which the people
against whom force was used acted in similar ways—cases in
89 See infra text accompanying notes 96–111 (describing how three Ninth Circuit decisions—two of which were consolidated, resulting in a single opinion—were used to assess
defendants’ entitlement to qualified immunity in a Ninth Circuit case).
90 For a description of these decisions, including the underlying facts and the manner
in which they clearly establish the law, see Appendix, supra note 87.
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which people tried to use a gun, a knife, or another weapon; displayed but did not try to use a weapon; were suspected of having
a weapon; engaged in some form of resistance; or engaged in no
resistance at all.
A description of the holdings and rationales of each of these
284 decisions is far beyond the scope of this Article. But discussion of just a few of these decisions in one area—tasers—illustrates just how fine the factual distinctions can be between cases,
and the importance of those distinctions to the qualified immunity analysis. Take, for example, Isayeva v. Sacramento Sheriff’s
Department,91 a Ninth Circuit decision reversing the district
court’s denial of qualified immunity.92 Sacramento County Sheriff’s deputies responded to a domestic disturbance call, and were
told someone at the home had possible drug and mental health
issues.93 There was evidence that the person, Paul Tereschenko,
may have been under the influence of methamphetamine and had
been hearing voices. The deputies told Tereschenko that they
were going to take him to a hospital for evaluation. As the Ninth
Circuit explains:
Tereschenko initially complied, but kept turning back
around. Fearing that Tereschenko was reaching for something, Deputy [Sean] Barry grabbed one of his arms. Deputy
[Corbin] Gray grabbed the other. Tereschenko stiffened his
arms and tried to get his hands free by pushing the officers
and resisting Deputy Gray’s attempt at a control hold. Both
deputies told Tereschenko to stop resisting. The deputies
struggled with the resisting Tereschenko, who was tossing
them around. Then, Deputy Barry tased Tereschenko in
drive-stun mode for a five-second cycle.94
In determining whether Deputy Barry was entitled to qualified immunity, the Ninth Circuit considered the similarity of
these facts to three other Ninth Circuit decisions involving tasers.
First, the court compared the facts to Bryan v. McPherson,95 a case
in which the Ninth Circuit found an officer’s taser deployment

91

872 F.3d 938 (2017).
See id. at 953.
93 See id. at 942.
94 Id. at 948. One of the deputies later shot and killed Tereschenko. This discussion
focuses on the court’s analysis of the use of the taser.
95 630 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2010).
92
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violated the Fourth Amendment.96 The court observed that the
facts in Bryan and Isayeva were similar in many respects: “Both
Tereschenko and the plaintiff in Bryan were unarmed and were
tased without warning. Both were possibly mentally ill, were agitated, and failed to comply with at least one law enforcement
command. And neither had committed a serious crime.”97 Yet, according to the Isayeva court, the decision in Bryan did not clearly
establish that Deputy Barry’s conduct violated clearly established
law because there were factual distinctions between the cases:
while Deputy Barry used his taser in “drive-stun” mode, the officer in Bryan used his taser in “dart mode”; Tereschenko’s tasing
did not result in injury while the tasing in Bryan led to the loss of
four teeth and facial abrasions; and while Tereschenko struggled
with the deputies, the plaintiff in Bryan was fifteen to twenty-five
feet away when he was tased.98
Next, the Isayeva court compared the constitutionality of
Deputy Barry’s conduct with the facts of two other Ninth Circuit
cases that were consolidated and heard together en banc—Brooks
v. City of Seattle and Mattos v. Agarano99—in which the Ninth
Circuit found the officers’ taser use violated the Constitution.100
In Brooks, a seven-month-pregnant woman was pulled over for
speeding and would not sign a traffic citation or exit her car.101
When an officer forcibly tried to remove her from her vehicle, she
“stiffened her body and clutched the steering wheel,” and an officer tased her in drive-stun mode three times in less than a minute.102 In Mattos, officers responded to a domestic dispute and
the plaintiff got between the officers and her husband, extending
her arms to prevent the officer from coming closer.103 The officer

96 See id. at 832. In Bryan, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of
summary judgment, holding that—viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff—the officer’s use of the taser was unconstitutional.
97 Isayeva, 872 F.3d at 948.
98 Id. at 948–49.
99 Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (consolidated), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 130, 130–31 (2012).
100 Id. at 452. In this consolidated opinion, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the facts—
viewed in the light most favorable to both of the plaintiffs—established constitutional violations, but that the officers in both cases were entitled to qualified immunity.
101 See id. at 436–37.
102 Id. at 437.
103 Id. at 439.
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tased the plaintiff once in dart mode.104 The Isayeva court again
found factual similarities between the cases:
Tereschenko was not armed. Nor were the plaintiffs in
Brooks and in Mattos. None of these plaintiffs had committed
a serious crime. And none was given an adequate warning.
Tereschenko and the plaintiff in Brooks both resisted the officers by stiffening up. And all three plaintiffs tried to frustrate the officers by plaintiffs’ physical efforts.105
Despite these similarities, the Isayeva court concluded that
Brooks and Mattos did not clearly establish the unconstitutionality of Deputy Barry’s conduct.106 Tereschenko was a “very big
man,” and larger than the officers, while the plaintiffs in Brooks
and Mattos were female and one was pregnant.107 Tereschenko
“was strong enough to toss the deputies around and frustrate
their physical efforts to constrain him” while the plaintiff in Mattos “merely extended her arms.”108 Tereschenko was “likely under
the influence of drugs” while available evidence suggests the
plaintiffs in Brooks and Mattos were sober.109 And Tereschenko
was tased only once in drive-stun mode, while the Brooks plaintiff
was tased three times in less than a minute, and the Mattos
plaintiff was tased in the more severe dart mode.110 Thus, the
Ninth Circuit concluded, the factual distinctions between Isayeva
and Bryan, Brooks, and Mattos meant that these decisions did not
“put the constitutionality of Deputy Barry’s actions ‘beyond debate.’” 111 For these reasons, the court granted Deputy Barry qualified immunity.
In granting Deputy Barry qualified immunity, the Isayeva
court did not address the district court’s decision that a reasonable jury could find Deputy Barry violated the Constitution. But
it is perhaps useful to take a moment to appreciate the distinction
between an analysis of the constitutionality of Deputy Barry’s
conduct and his entitlement to qualified immunity, and the distinct roles that cases like Bryan, Brooks, and Mattos would play
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111

Mattos, 661 F.3d at 439.
Isayeva, 872 F.3d at 949.
See id. at 950.
Id. at 949.
Id.
Id. at 950.
See Isayeva, 872 F.3d at 950.
Id. (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741).
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in these analyses. To determine the constitutionality of Deputy
Barry’s conduct, the Ninth Circuit would assess whether, under
the totality of the circumstances, and viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, Officer Barry’s decision to
tase Tereschenko for five seconds in drive-stun mode was objectively reasonable. In reaching its conclusion, the Isayeva court
would consider the Graham factors, “including the severity of the
crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to
the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”112 The court
might analogize or distinguish to other cases, including Bryan,
Brooks, and Mattos, when deciding whether a jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff. But the key question would be whether
the deputy’s conduct was objectively reasonable given the facts
apparent to the officer at the time.
In a qualified immunity analysis, in contrast, the focus is not
on whether the Constitution was violated, but on whether prior
court decisions are sufficiently similar to put the defendant on
notice of the unconstitutionality of his behavior. In granting Deputy Barry qualified immunity, the Isayeva court concluded that
the factual distinctions between the events that unfolded between
Deputy Barry and Paul Tereschenko on the one hand, and Bryan,
Brooks, and Mattos on the other hand—including differences in
the taser mode used, the number of times the people were tased,
the injuries suffered by the people tased, the distance of the officers to the people tased, the relative size of the people tased to the
officers who tased them, and the nature of the resistance—meant
that Deputy Barry would not have had fair notice of the unconstitutionality of his conduct. Thus, the qualified immunity analysis
assumes that Deputy Barry knew the precise details of the facts
underlying Bryan, Brooks, and Mattos and considered the distinctions between those facts and the situation with Tereschenko as
it was unfolding before him.
But did Deputy Barry actually know about the facts in Bryan,
Brooks, and Mattos? Did he recall these decisions while deciding
whether to tase Paul Tereschenko, what taser mode to use, and
how long to apply the force? Would any law enforcement officer,
in Deputy Barry’s situation, know about and recall these cases?
When considering the likelihood of these prospects, keep in mind
112

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
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that discussion in this Part has focused on 3 of 18 (22.2%) Ninth
Circuit cases addressing the constitutionality of taser use, just a
miniscule portion (1.4%) of the 284 Ninth Circuit and Supreme
Court use-of-force decisions I found that could be used to clearly
establish the law, and an even smaller percentage of Ninth Circuit decisions involving other types of constitutional claims and
circuit court decisions around the country that could clearly establish the law.
Courts and commentators have suggested in passing that officers could not possibly know about the facts of all these cases or
consider them during their work.113 But neither the Supreme
Court’s assumption of notice—nor courts’ and commentators’
skepticism about that notice—has been empirically tested until now.
III. WHAT POLICE KNOW ABOUT “CLEARLY ESTABLISHED LAW”
In order to better understand whether police officers know
about the types of court decisions that clearly establish the law
for the purposes of qualified immunity, I examined policies, trainings, and other materials provided to California law enforcement
officers about Ninth Circuit decisions interpreting Graham and
Garner. In this Part, I describe my findings.
In sum, I find California officers appear to be regularly informed about the general principles in Graham and Garner. This
finding is consistent with other evidence that police departments
incorporate information about watershed decisions and statutory
requirements into their policies and trainings.114 Indeed, in my
113

See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., POLICE EXEC. RSCH. F., GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON USE OF FORCE 18 (2016)
(explaining that, after the Fourth Circuit held that using a taser repeatedly in drive-stun
mode was unconstitutional, “several agencies in jurisdictions covered by the Fourth Circuit ruling amended their use-of-force and ECW [Electronic Control Weapons] policies” in
response to the decision); Lawrence Rosenthal, Seven Theses in Grudging Defense of the
Exclusionary Rule, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 525, 543 (2013) (citations omitted):
114

After the Court prohibited random stops of motorists to check their licenses and
registration in Delaware v. Prouse, the District of Columbia Police Department
almost immediately overhauled its policies to comply with the new ruling. More
recently, after the Court held that the installation and subsequent use of a GPS
device to monitor a vehicle’s movements was a “search” within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment in United States v. Jones, the FBI’s general counsel reported that the decision caused the agency to turn off nearly 3,000 monitoring
devices.
See also David Alan Sklansky, Is the Exclusionary Rule Obsolete?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
567, 580–81 (2008) (observing that California law enforcement agencies stopped training
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review, I found instances in which new legal requirements—including a California statute that changed the definition of excessive force and a California Supreme Court decision that clarified
the negligence standard as it applies to law enforcement—were
communicated to officers.115 But my review of California police department policies and trainings, advice from government attorneys, and other sources makes clear that officers are not educated
about the facts and holdings of cases applying Graham and Garner to various factual scenarios—precisely the types of cases that
the Supreme Court says are necessary to give fair notice to officers and clearly establish the law for the purposes of qualified
immunity.
To be clear, this Article should not be read to endorse California law enforcement agencies’ reliance on Graham and Garner.
Instead, I agree with scholars, government agencies, civil rights
groups, and some law enforcement officials that have criticized
Graham and called for the decision to play less of a role in police
department policies.116 This Article should also not be read to

their officers not to conduct warrantless searches of trash—a requirement of California
constitutional law—after the U.S. Supreme Court rejected this prohibition); Charles D.
Weisselberg, In the Stationhouse After Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1121, 1135–54 (2001)
(examining how California law enforcement agencies trained officers to comply with a Supreme Court decision reaffirming Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)); LAPD Commission Adds to Guidelines for Review of Police Use of Force, NBC L.A. (Feb. 18, 2014),
https://perma.cc/6CX7-SKL5 (reporting that Hayes v. County of San Diego, 57 Cal. 4th
622, 639 (2013), a decision by the California Supreme Court that “tactical conduct and
decisions preceding the use of deadly force are relevant considerations under California
law in determining whether the use of deadly force gives rise to negligence liability” caused
the Los Angeles Police Commission to change the ways in which it evaluates whether force
used by its officers was proper).
115 See, e.g., SAN BERNARDINO CNTY. SHERIFF’S DEP’T REG’L TRAINING CTR., FORCE
OPTIONS SIMULATOR—PSP: EXPANDED COURSE OUTLINE 3–4 (on file with author) (describing the ways in which California Assembly Bill 392 changed the definition of excessive
force, and indicating that officers watched a video produced by California Police Officer
Standards and Training that outlined the details of the new law); see also infra note 203
(describing a newsletter disseminated to Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department officials that
describes the facts and holding of Hayes v. County of San Diego).
116 See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some
of the Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479, 1505 (2016) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment,
including the Graham and Garner frameworks as well as the Court’s interpretation of the
power of police to stop, search, and arrest, amounts to a “Privileges and Immunities Clause
for police officers—it confers tremendous power and discretion to police officers with respect to when they can engage people (the ‘privilege’ protection of the Fourth Amendment)
and protects them from criminal and civil sanction with respect to how they engage people
(the ‘immunities’ protection of the Fourth Amendment)” (emphasis in original)); Rachel
Harmon, When is Police Violence Justified?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1119, 1127 (2008) (arguing
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suggest that police should be educated about the hundreds or
thousands of court decisions that apply Graham and Garner to
various factual scenarios. Although I believe law enforcement
could make better use of the insights about police power contained in court decisions, I do not believe it would be a productive
use of time for officers to study every court decision that might
clearly establish the law.117
My focus in this Article is not on what form police use-of-force
policies and trainings should take. It is, instead, on the extent to
which the Supreme Court’s expectation that officers have notice
of decisions applying Graham and Garner—an expectation that
underlies the Court’s qualified immunity doctrine and definition
of “clearly established law”—has basis in reality. For the reasons
that follow, I find that it does not.
A. Methodology
Before describing my findings, it makes sense to answer a few
possible questions about my methodological choices.
First, why California? California is the nation’s most populous state and has more than five hundred law enforcement agencies; for those reasons alone it is a worthwhile subject of study.118

that Supreme Court doctrine on use of force is “deeply problematic” because “[i]t provides
unprincipled, indeterminate, and sometimes simply misleading guidance” by failing “to
articulate a systematic conceptual framework for assessing police uses of force.”); Brandon
Garrett & Seth Stoughton, A Tactical Fourth Amendment, 103 VA. L. REV. 211, 291 (2017)
(“To the extent that police agencies rely on Supreme Court rulings to inform use-of-force
and tactics training, we view such approaches as ill advised.”); Seth W. Stoughton, How
the Fourth Amendment Frustrates the Regulation of Police Violence, 70 EMORY L.J. 521,
526 (2021) (explaining that the Graham factors “have limited analytical value” and “[a]t
best, [ ] serve as weak and potentially misleading proxies for the governmental interests
that can justify the use of force by police, offering no guidance on what type of force or how
much force officers can legitimately use in any given situation”); see also POLICE EXEC.
RSCH. F., supra note 114, at 35–36 (recommending that police agencies “continue to develop best policies, practices, and training on use-of-force issues that go beyond the minimum requirements of Graham v. Connor” in order to “provide more concrete guidance to
officers” and to “help prevent officers from being placed in situations where they have no
choice but to make split-second decisions that may result in injuries or death to themselves
or others”).
117 For further discussion of the ways in which police might benefit from closer attention to court decisions, see infra notes 223–24 and accompanying text.
118 See Weisselberg, supra note 114, at 1123 (studying police policies and trainings in
California, and noting that “California is the nation’s most populous state and has the
largest criminal justice system of all the states” such that “what happens in California is
therefore significant in its own right”); see also BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
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But I focused on California for another reason: a recently passed
law requires law enforcement agencies to “conspicuously” post all
policies and training materials that would be subject to disclosure
under public records requests.119 Not all departments appear to
have fulfilled their obligations under the law. But many have, and
those policies and training outlines offer valuable information
with which to understand law enforcement policies and trainings
in the state, and the role that court decisions play in each. Although California is unique in its number of law enforcement
agencies and officers as well as in its transparency regarding policies and trainings, there is no reason to believe that California’s
use-of-force policies and trainings are categorically different from
those in other states,120 or that its departments are outliers in the
manner and extent to which they educate their officers about
court decisions.121
Second, has my study captured all the ways a police officer
might come to learn about the facts and holdings in court decisions applying Graham and Garner? I share Professor Charles
Weisselberg’s view that “[m]ost police officers are not lawyers and
they do not usually read legal newspapers; thus, judicial opinions
will not have an impact in the stationhouse unless sworn personnel are formally instructed about them.”122 The Supreme Court
appears to agree that officers will not be “familiar with the
BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES,
2008, at 15 (2011) (reporting that, in 2008, California had 509 law enforcement agencies).
119 CAL. PENAL CODE § 13650 (West 2018). For further description of these obligations, see Bulletin No. 2019-29, Manuel Alvarez, Jr., Comm’n on Peace Officer Standards
and Training, Action Required: Senate Bill 978 Requires Publication of All Non-Exempt
Education and Training Materials, Including Presenter Course Content, on POST’s Website by January 1, 2020 (Sept. 24, 2019), https://perma.cc/P64S-BRT9.
120 For a description of California departments’ use-of-force policies as compared to
use-of-force policies across the country, see infra note 134 and accompanying text. For the
number of training hours and requirements in California, as compared to the national
average, see infra note 148 and accompanying text.
121 See Telephone Interview with Roger Clark, Police Pracs. Expert (Aug. 28, 2020)
(on file with author) (reporting that use-of-force policies and trainings “always cite Graham and Garner, and that’s about it”); E-mail from Jack Ryan, Att’y, Legal & Liab. Risk
Mgmt. Inst., to Joanna C. Schwartz (Sept. 1, 2020, 3:36 PM) (on file with author) (“To the
extent there is legal training, it is mostly done in the basic academy before the pre-service
recruits have any field experience to give them a frame of reference with respect to application. . . . [W]ith respect to use of force, most trainings cover Garner and Graham but
little else.”); Interview with Lou Reiter, Police Consultant, Lou Reiter and Assocs. (May 5,
2020) (one file with author) (“We have interesting case law out there, but it’s not getting
out there to people in the street.”).
122 Weisselberg, supra note 114, at 1135.
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constitutional constraints on the use of deadly force” except
through training.123 Accordingly, I have focused my study on California law enforcement agencies’ use-of-force policies and use-offorce training outlines that guide basic training, in-service training, and the training of instructors who teach these basic and inservice training courses.
But I did not limit my research to policies and trainings. I
also submitted public records requests to district attorneys and
city attorneys to determine whether they provided officers with
any additional information about court decisions, and I researched other subscription services that might provide legal information relevant to law enforcement officers.
In addition, I corresponded with representatives from two entities that play an outsized role in California police policies and
trainings, to make sure I was getting a comprehensive lay of the
land. The first is Lexipol LLC, a private, for-profit provider of police department policies and trainings that counts approximately
95% of California law enforcement agencies—and over 3,500 public safety agencies in 35 states across the country—as its clients.124
The second is the State of California Commission on Peace Officer
Standards and Training (California POST), which sets minimum
standards for police officers’ basic and in-service training—including the subjects covered and the amount of time spent on various areas—and approves training outlines as sufficient to satisfy
those requirements.125 Finally, I consulted with three police-practices experts who offered insights about the extent to which

123 Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 64 (2011) (“There is no reason to assume that
police academy applicants are familiar with the constitutional constraints on the use of
deadly force. And, in the absence of training, there is no way for novice officers to obtain
the legal knowledge they require.”).
124 For an overview of Lexipol’s role in police policymaking, see generally Ingrid V.
Eagly & Joanna C. Schwartz, Lexipol: The Privatization of Police Policymaking, 96 TEX.
L. REV. 891 (2018). For the number of law enforcement agency subscribers to Lexipol, see
Press Release, Lexipol and Praetorian Digital Merge, Creating Comprehensive Content,
Training and Policy Platform for Public Safety, GLOBALNEWSWIRE (Feb. 8, 2019),
https://perma.cc/T3XQ-MVJS. Because Lexipol provides policies to so many agencies, their
practices and perspectives have a disproportionate impact not only on California agencies,
but also on agencies nationwide.
125 For an overview of the role of California POST in police policies and trainings, see
Weisselberg, supra note 114, at 1136–40; About POST, CAL. COMM’N ON PEACE OFFICER
STANDARDS AND TRAINING, https://perma.cc/SVB9-9VKW. For more information and access to training outlines, see POST, https://post.ca.gov/.
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California policies and trainings are reflective of practices nationwide.126
It is certainly possible that an officer might come to learn
about a court decision through some informal means not captured
in this study. But by exploring hundreds of police policies, training outlines, and other briefing materials received by California
law enforcement officers, I have examined the primary mechanisms by which law enforcement officers would learn about court
decisions that clearly establish the law.127
Third, why examine officers’ understanding of use-of-force
cases? Focusing on cases interpreting Graham and Garner—and
the extent to which officers know about those cases—makes sense
for a few reasons. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized
that Graham and Garner on their own do not clearly establish the
law—instead, plaintiffs need to point to decisions applying Graham and Garner to the particular factual circumstances confronted by the officers.128 In addition, standards for the use of force
play a predominant role in police department policies and trainings.129 As Professor Chris Slobogin has observed, “[t]he single
area in which most police departments have both rigorous training and systematic administrative rules is in the use of force.”130

126 See Telephone Interview with Roger Clark, supra note 121 (reporting that he has
consulted in more than two thousand cases and testified in more than one thousand cases
in twenty-seven states); Attorneys/Expert Witness, LEGAL & LIAB. RISK MGMT. INST.,
https://perma.cc/F6P9-U8US (describing Jack Ryan’s experience training police officers
around the country and his role as a codirector of the Legal and Liability Risk Management Institute, “which provides services relating to risk management for law enforcement
agencies nationwide.”); Biography of Lou Reiter (on file with author) (explaining that
Reiter trains more than 1,000 police practitioners each year, conducts police agency management audits and liability assessments, including eight investigations of law enforcement agencies undertaken by the U.S. Department of Justice, and has served as an expert
witness in more than 1,100 civil suits involving the police).
127 Accord Weisselberg, supra note 114, at 1135–36 (examining the impact of court
cases interpreting Miranda on police practices by analyzing law enforcement agencies’ inservice training manuals and instructional materials produced by California POST and
district attorneys’ offices).
128 See supra notes 47–51 and accompanying text (describing Supreme Court decisions setting out this requirement).
129 See Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 116, at 250–52 (explaining that virtually all
training academies instruct on firearms and use of force, and that recruits spend more
time on these topics than any other area of training); see also infra note 132 and accompanying text.
130 Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U.
ILL. L. REV. 363, 396 (noting that this area also “happens to be one of the few domains
where the police are successfully sued for large sums of money”).
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So, both the Supreme Court’s decisions and the structure of police
department policies and trainings suggest that if there is any
area of the law about which officers would learn about the facts
and holdings of court decisions, that area would concern the use
of force. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that trainings or
educational materials in other areas of the law rely more heavily
on the facts and holdings of court opinions interpreting watershed
cases.131
B. Policies
Virtually every law enforcement agency has a policy manual—
a document that is often hundreds of pages long and sets out general standards for police officer conduct.132 And virtually all of
these policy manuals contain policies—which can themselves be
many pages long—regarding the use of force by officers.133
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Graham and Garner play
an outsized role in law enforcement use-of-force policies nationwide.134 Graham also plays a starring role in most California
agencies’ use-of-force policies. More than 95% of California’s law
enforcement agencies have use-of-force policies designed by

131 See Telephone Interview with Roger Clark, supra note 121 (reporting that trainings in other areas—including arrests, for example—may include more references to state
statutes but are no more likely than use-of-force policies and trainings to incorporate references to court decisions that would clearly establish the law).
132 See SETH W. STOUGHTON, JEFFREY J. NOBLE & GEOFFREY P. ALPERT, EVALUATING
POLICE USES OF FORCE 97 (2020) (explaining that, “[a]s of 2000, the most recent year for
which data [was] available, . . . over 93 percent of police agencies had written rules related
to the use of deadly force and 87 percent had written rules related to the use of less-lethal
force”).
133 See, e.g., CONTRA COSTA CNTY. OFF. OF THE SHERIFF, POLICY AND PROCEDURES
MANUAL: USE OF FORCE POLICY 575–90 (June 25, 2020) (on file with author) (16 pages);
S.F. POLICE DEP’T, GENERAL ORDER 5.01: USE OF FORCE POLICY (Dec. 21, 2016) (on file
with author) (19 pages); UPLAND POLICE DEP’T, POLICY AND PROCEDURES MANUAL CH. 8:
WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND USE OF FORCE POLICY (on file with author) (54 pages); DAVIS
POLICE DEP’T, USE OF FORCE POLICY (Sept. 2020) (on file with author) (28 pages); SAN
JOSE POLICE DEP’T, DUTY MANUAL § L 2600: USE OF FORCE POLICY, PUBLIC VERSION (on
file with author) (30 pages).
134 See Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 116, at 219, 285 (finding that “[a]bout half”
of the policies for the fifty largest police departments “relied upon language from Graham
and the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment cases”); Stoughton, supra note 116, at 568–
72 (describing the ways in which Graham is integrated into police policies); Osagie K.
Obasogie & Zachary Newman, Police Violence, Use of Force Policies, and Public Health,
43 AM. J.L. & MED. 279, 286–87 (2017) (arguing that agency policies “over-rely on reciting
the basic constitutional standard for police engagements . . . .”).
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Lexipol LLC.135 And Lexipol’s use-of-force policy—which instructs
that officers “shall use only that amount of force that reasonably
appears necessary given the facts and totality of the circumstances known to or perceived by the officer at the time of the
event,” and that “[t]he reasonableness of force will be judged from
the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene at the time of
the incident”—is drawn almost verbatim from the language in
Graham.136
Although Lexipol’s use-of-force policy relies heavily on the
language in Graham, cases applying Graham—that clearly establish the law for qualified immunity purposes—appear nowhere in
the policy. Lexipol’s policy manual includes no examples of how
its use-of-force policy might apply to various factual scenarios. Instead, Lexipol’s policy explains, “no policy can realistically predict
every possible situation an officer might encounter,” and so “officers are entrusted to use well-reasoned discretion in determining
the appropriate use of force in each incident.”137
More generally, Lexipol’s representatives reported to me that
they “rarely, if ever, utilize appellate decisions as a basis for policy change.”138 Indeed, in the view of Bruce D. Praet, a government
defense attorney who cofounded Lexipol, there are no circuit court
decisions that have clearly established the law with any more
specificity than Graham provides. He writes:
I [ ] have not really yet seen a circuit court decision which
clearly identifies new circumstances sufficient to establish a
new rule beyond good old “objective reasonableness” under
the “totality of the circumstances” in each case. . . . This is
why our policies reinforce this [Graham] standard and attempt to provide officers with guidance on how to assess and

135

See Eagly & Schwartz, supra note 124, at 893–94.
See, e.g., ANAHEIM POLICE DEP’T, POLICY MANUAL § 300.3: USE OF FORCE 49 (2020)
(on file with author). Lexipol’s national use of force policy has slightly different wording,
but still hews closely to the language in Graham. LEXIPOL, USE OF FORCE POLICY,
ANYTOWN POLICE DEPARTMENT (2020). Lexipol explains on its web page that it’s national
model policy “is intended as a starting point for local governments and agencies preparing
policies for dealing with use of force. This is a national-level policy and references holdings
from federal case law but does not include applicable state or local requirements.” Id.
137 ANAHEIM POLICE DEP’T, supra note 136, at § 300.3, 49.
138 E-mail from Bruce D. Praet, Co-Founder, Lexipol, to Joanna C. Schwartz (May 5,
2020 2:43 PM) (on file with author).
136
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articulate the totality of each set of circumstances when making the often split-second decision to use force.139
In sum, police officers employed by 3,500 agencies in 35 states
across the country—including officers employed by the 95% of
California law enforcement agencies that subscribe to Lexipol—
are highly unlikely to have any guidance from their policy manuals about the facts or holdings of any court decisions applying
Graham and Garner.140
Among the two hundred largest law enforcement agencies in
California, there are twenty-five that do not subscribe to Lexipol.
I found more variation in these departments’ use-of-force policies,
but minimal attention to court decisions beyond Graham and
Garner.141 Like the Lexipol policies, these jurisdictions’ use-offorce policies appear to rely generally on the principles set out in
Graham and Garner. Some explicitly mention Graham and, less
frequently, Garner.142 Among them, only three—the Alameda
139 E-mail from Bruce D. Praet, Co-Founder, Lexipol, to Joanna C. Schwartz (May 5,
2020, 3:49 PM) (on file with author).
140 Lexipol subscribers can modify their policies, but those changes will revert as soon
as there is a policy update. See Eagly & Schwartz, supra note 124, at 935–36. In reviewing
Lexipol policy manuals, I have not seen a manual that adjusts use-of-force policies in ways
that incorporate the facts or holdings of court decisions beyond Graham and Garner.
141 As of 2018, among the largest two hundred law enforcement agencies in California,
twenty-six did not contract with Lexipol and another eight did subscribe with Lexipol but
published their own policy manuals that drew in some manner on Lexipol’s materials. See
Eagly & Schwartz, supra note 124, at 960–76. I reviewed the current use-of-force policies
for these thirty-four independent and hybrid jurisdictions for this Article, and found that
nine of the thirty-four jurisdictions have adopted Lexipol’s standard use-of-force policy.
See, e.g., RIVERSIDE CNTY. SHERIFF’S DEP’T, DEPARTMENT STANDARDS MANUAL
POLICY 300: USE OF FORCE 55–60 (2020) (on file with author); TORRANCE POLICE DEP’T,
supra note 136 ; IRVINE POLICE DEP’T, POLICIES: POLICY 310 USE OF FORCE 180–86 (2020)
(on file with author); SANTA CLARA POLICE DEP’T, S.C.P.D. POLICY MANUAL: POLICY 300
USE OF FORCE (2019) (on file with author); BEVERLY HILLS POLICE DEP’T, B.H.P.D. POLICY
MANUAL: POLICY 300 USE OF FORCE 31–37 (2018) (on file with author); EL CAJON POLICE
DEP’T, E.C.P.D. POLICY MANUAL: POLICY 300 USE OF FORCE 40–47 (2019) (on file with author); SOLANO CNTY. SHERIFF’S OFF., POLICY MANUAL: POLICY 300 USE OF FORCE 34–41
(2020) (on file with author); BUTTE CNTY. SHERIFF’S OFF., POLICY MANUAL: POLICY 300
USE OF FORCE 39–45 (2020) (on file with author); INDIO POLICE DEP’T, INDIO P.D. POLICY
MANUAL: POLICY 300 USE OF FORCE (2020).
142 See, e.g., L.A. POLICE DEP'T, 556.10 POLICY ON THE USE OF FORCE (on file with author):

Pursuant to the opinion issued by the United States Supreme Court in Graham
v. Connor, the Department examines the reasonableness of any particular force
used: a) from the perspective of a reasonable Los Angeles Police Officer with
similar training and experience, in the same situation; and b) based on the facts
and circumstances of each particular case.
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County Sheriff’s Office, the Kern County Sheriff’s Office, and the
Marin County Sheriff’s Department—referenced a case applying
Graham and Garner but included no detail about the cases’ facts
or holdings.
For example, the Alameda County Sheriff’s Office’s use-offorce policy instructs officers that they are “to follow all legal authority and standards in the application of force when dealing
with arrestees or detainees,”143 and then includes hyperlinked references to two California penal statutes and three court decisions:
Graham, Garner, and Forrester v. San Diego.144 The other two
manuals that reference court decisions are similarly opaque
about the nature of the cases referenced or their relevance to officers’ use-of-force analyses.145
Perhaps it is no surprise that police policy manuals do not
describe the details of cases applying Graham and Garner. After
all, policy manuals are intended to set out the general terms of
L.A. SHERIFF’S DEP’T, MANUAL OF POLICY AND PROCEDURES: CHAPTER 10—FORCE
POLICY 2 (on file with author) (“The basis in determining whether force is ‘unreasonable’
shall be consistent with the Supreme Court decision of Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386
(1989)”) (emphasis in original); KERN COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT USE OF FORCE
POLICY 2 (“‘Reasonableness’ of the force used must be judged from the perspective of a
reasonable officer on the scene at the time of the incident.” (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at
396)); PLACER CNTY. SHERIFF’S OFFICE, GENERAL ORDERS MANUAL OPERATIONAL
ORDER 1: USE OF FORCE 3 (2020) (on file with author) (Any interpretation of “reasonableness” must allow for the fact that law enforcement officers, in circumstances that are
tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving, are often forced to make split-second decisions
about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation under Graham v.
Connor.”); ESCONDIDO POLICE DEP’T, CRITICAL CORE POLICY TASKS: 1.24 USE OF FORCE
AND USE OF FORCE REVIEW COMMITTEE 2 (2020) (on file with author) (“Any analysis of the
use of force in the course of an arrest . . . shall be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment
and its ‘objective reasonableness’ standard.” (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 395–98)).
143 ALAMEDA CNTY. SHERIFF’S OFF., GENERAL ORDER 1.05: USE OF FORCE 2 (2020) (on
file with author).
144 25 F.3d 804 (9th Cir. 1994). For further discussion of the role played by Forrester
in police trainings, see infra notes 174–75 and accompanying text.
145 Marin County’s use-of-force policy lists several cases as “related standards” in its
thirty-page policy without descriptions of the cases or any contextualization. MARIN CNTY.
SHERIFF’S OFF., PATROL SERVICES POLICY AND PROCEDURE MANUAL, GENERAL POLICY:
USE OF FORCE (on file with author). The cases include Graham, Garner, Forrester, City of
Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (which sets out the standard for standing in cases
seeking injunctive relief), and Burns v. Honolulu (an unpublished 1979 district court decision unavailable on Westlaw). The Kern County Sheriff’s Office policy referenced a Second Circuit case and Supreme Court case in support of the proposition that “[f]orce used
within the Sheriff’s Office Facilities shall never be for the purpose of maliciously or sadistically causing harm.” KERN CNTY. SHERIFF’S OFF., supra note 142, at F-100-2 (first citing
Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973); and then citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S.
312 (1986)). There is no description of the facts of the cases.
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engagement, with the application of those principles illuminated
through procedures and trainings.146 One might expect that cases
applying Graham and Garner would not be included in police useof-force policies but would, instead, be described to officers in the
course of their trainings.147 Yet, as I describe in the next Section,
the types of use-of-force cases that clearly establish the law for
qualified immunity purposes play a minimal role in California officers’ trainings as well.
C. Trainings
In California, the Commission on Police Officer Standards
and Training sets the minimum hours and requirements for California law enforcement officers’ basic and continuing training.148
California POST also certifies law enforcement agencies’ and private companies’ detailed training outlines as sufficient to satisfy
these training hours, and is required by California law to post
those training outlines on their website.149
I searched on California POST’s website to find trainings regarding uses of force by searching terms like “force,” “arrest,” and
“firearm.” Each of these terms revealed dozens of course names,
and many courses with the same name were offered by several or
even dozens of departments and educational providers. I focused
on those trainings that included legal updates or the state of the

146 For one description of the distinction between policies and procedures, see Eagly
& Schwartz, supra note 124, at 903 n.59 (describing Lexipol representatives’ views that “a
policy manual ‘[a]nswers majority organizational issues,’ is ‘[u]sually expressed in broad
terms,’ has ‘[w]idespread application,’ and ‘[c]hanges less frequently’” (alterations in original)); see also Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 116, at 249–52 (describing the differences
between police use-of-force policies and tactics).
147 Weisselberg, supra note 114, at 1135 (“[I]n-service training makes the most significant contribution to officers’ understanding of search and seizure law.”).
148 See Minimum Standards for Training, CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 1005 (2020).
Training practices vary widely around the country. Each state has different requirements
about the minimum training hours required for law enforcement officers who serve in their
state. For a description of training requirements across the country, see State Law Enforcement Training Requirements, INST. FOR CRIM. JUST. TRAINING REFORM,
https://perma.cc/4NRY-6H4Y. Note that, nationwide, states require an average of 647
basic training hours and 21 yearly in-service training hours. California requires 664 basic
training hours and 12 yearly in-service training hours.
149 See Telephone Interview with Meagan Catafi, Pub. Info. Officer, Cal. Comm’n on
Peace Officer Standards and Training (May 7, 2020) (explaining that the training outlines
they approve are “an expanded course outline to the third degree” and that “[b]asically,
what are you teaching and tell us everything down to that third level of detail”).
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law as one of the course objectives.150 Based on this review, I found
twenty-four course titles with training outlines that referenced
legal updates among their objectives—one regular basic training
course, nineteen in-service training courses, and four courses designed for instructors. On California POST’s website, there were
a total of 329 courses with these titles offered by local law enforcement agencies and educational institutions.151 In the subsections
that follow, I describe these courses and the extremely limited
role that Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit decisions applying
Graham and Garner appear to play in them.152
1. Basic training.
All California law enforcement officers must go through basic
training, including training about use of force. California POST
has designated forty-three “learning domains” that regular basic
training must contain, ranging from “leadership, professionalism,
and ethics” to “controlled substances” to “investigative report
writing,” to “cultural diversity/discrimination.”153 “Use of
force/deescalation”—domain 20—includes among its learning objectives the “Fourth Amendment standard for determining objective reasonableness as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court”
and the “legal framework establishing a peace officer’s authority
during a legal arrest.”154
California POST appears to intend that Graham and Garner
play the predominant role in officers’ regular basic training about
150 There are numerous types of courses—in, for example, firearm tactics, takedown
techniques, and racial bias—that do not include legal updates among their aims. Accordingly, I have not included those courses in this discussion.
151 Some departments have submitted multiple versions of the same training; I have
reviewed all available versions, but am treating these multiple versions as a single training when counting the total number of trainings in this study.
152 Note that, even when training outlines include references to cases, it is not certain
that these cases are included in the actual trainings provided to officers. See Interview
with Roger Clark, supra note 121:

Even when outlines are loaded with case law as reference it doesn’t get discussed
in the classroom. There will be a general comment about this that or the other
thing and the citation. But there will never be a discussion of the court cases in
the trainings. I don’t think that any training is ever presented in terms of case law.
153 CAL. COMM’N ON PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS AND TRAINING, Regular Basic Course
Training Specifications, POST.CA., https://perma.cc/MQ4H-VKKK.
154 CAL. COMM’N ON PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS AND TRAINING, TRAINING AND
TESTING SPECIFICATIONS FOR LEARNING DOMAIN #20: USE OF FORCE/DEESCALATION 1
(2020) (on file with author).
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the constitutional bounds of uses of force. California POST has
created a student workbook that basic training programs use, and
its section on Use of Force/Deescalation describes the Supreme
Court’s holdings in Graham and Garner in some detail.155
FIGURE 1: CALIFORNIA POST’S REGULAR BASIC TRAINING
WORKBOOK (DISCUSSION OF GRAHAM AND GARNER)156

After describing the holdings in Graham and Garner, the
basic training workbook offers a series of examples that set out
situations in which force would be appropriate and when it would
155 See CAL. COMM’N ON PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS AND TRAINING, BASIC COURSE
WORKBOOK SERIES: LEARNING DOMAIN 20 USE OF FORCE 1-3 to -6, 3-4 (2018).
156 Id. at 3-4.
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not. None are identified as court opinions, and do not appear to
resemble particular cases.
FIGURE 2: CALIFORNIA POST’S REGULAR BASIC TRAINING
WORKBOOK (FORCE EXAMPLES)157

The basic training materials also make clear that these examples should serve only as guideposts. As the student workbook
explains:
Peace officers are often forced to make split-second judgments about the correct course of action to take in a given
circumstance in conditions that are tense, uncertain and
rapidly evolving. The actions described [in the use-of-force
workbook] should not be considered as the only reasonable
options available to an officer to effectively handle a given
situation. Unless it is specifically stated as such, actions do
not necessarily need to occur in the order that they are written. It is incumbent on the officer to select and use a response

157

Id. at 2-11.

2021]

Qualified Immunity’s Boldest Lie

643

that is objectively reasonable under the totality of the facts
and circumstances confronting the officer at the time.158
In other words, the workbook provides an overview of the Graham
and Garner holdings, and then emphasizes that officers are not
intended to memorize the examples in the workbook, but to use
the examples as a means of getting comfortable with exercising
judgment consistent with Graham and Garner in innumerable
scenarios not captured in its pages.
The twenty-one Regular Basic Training outlines available on
California POST’s website—reflecting the substance of trainers’
instruction while recruits complete the POST workbook—similarly appear to focus primarily on Graham and Garner with limited reference to Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit decisions that
could clearly establish use-of-force law.
TABLE 1: COURT DECISIONS REFERENCED IN REGULAR BASIC
TRAINING OUTLINES
Case References
No cases referenced
Reference to “case law”
Reference to “case law” and/or Graham and/or Garner
Reference to one other Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit use-of-force case (with or without other references to “case law,” Graham and/or Garner)
Reference to two Ninth Circuit/Supreme Court cases
other than Graham and/or Garner
Reference to three or more Ninth Circuit/Supreme
Court cases other than Graham and/or Garner
Total basic training courses

Number of
Outlines (%)
3 (14.3%)
6 (28.6%)
7 (33.3%)
5 (23.8%)
0
0
21

These outlines, which can span hundreds of pages, all include
some training on use of force/deescalation. Of the twenty-one
outlines, sixteen (76.2%) reference no cases in their discussion of
use of force, “case law” generally, or “case law” plus Graham
and/or Garner. Five (23.8%) of the twenty-one basic training
outlines reference one of four additional Supreme Court or Ninth
158

Id. at iii.
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Circuit use-of-force cases in addition to Graham and/or Garner
and/or “case law.”159 No trainings reference more than one Ninth
Circuit or Supreme Court use-of-force decision beyond Graham
and/or Garner.
2. In-service training.
California POST also requires that officers certify they have
completed at least twenty-four hours of additional training every
two years. Of those twenty-four hours, twelve must concern “perishable skills,” including four hours on each of three topics: “arrest and control,” “driver training/awareness or driving simulator,” and “tactical firearms or force options simulator.”160 Legal
issues are among the required topics of perishable skills trainings
regarding tactical firearms and arrest and control.161 California
POST also recommends that various legal topics be covered in the
remaining twelve hours of biannual officer training.162
I reviewed 267 detailed training outlines approved by California POST to satisfy in-service training requirements, including
firearms, force options, and arrest and control perishable training
requirements, and training materials covering other optional topics that include the use of force.163 Although legal issues are

159 OAKLAND POLICE DEP’T, EXPANDED COURSE OUTLINE: REGULAR BASIC COURSE 523, 35-190 to 35-200 (2020) (on file with author) (referencing “case law,” Graham, and
Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc)); SAN JOSE POLICE
ACAD., EXPANDED COURSE OUTLINE: REGULAR BASIC COURSE 26, 296 (2016) (on file with
author) (referencing “case law” and Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272 (9th Cir. 2001) (en
banc)); SANTA CLARA CNTY. SHERIFF’S OFF., EXPANDED COURSE OUTLINE: REGULAR BASIC
COURSE (2020) (on file with author) (referencing “case law,” Graham, Garner, and Bryan);
STANISLAUS CNTY. REG’L TRAINING DIV., REGULAR BASIC COURSE: EXPANDED COURSE
OUTLINE 125–26 (referencing “case law” and Graham); VENTURA CNTY. CRIM. JUS.
TRAINING CTR., EXPANDED COURSE OUTLINE: REGULAR BASIC COURSE 27, 103 (2019) (on
file with author) (referencing “case law,” Garner, and Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007)).
For descriptions of the facts and holdings in these referenced cases, see Appendix, supra
note 87.
160 Perishable Skills Program, CAL. COMM’N ON PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS AND
TRAINING, https://perma.cc/6XQY-TW77.
161 Continuing Professional Training and Perishable Skills, CAL. COMM’N ON PEACE
OFFICER STANDARDS AND TRAINING, https://perma.cc/Y98Z-TYY4.
162 Although those twelve hours can concern any topic, the Commission recommends
training on “new laws,” “recent court decisions and/or search and seizure refresher,” and
“civil liability–causing subjects” among other topics. See id.
163 Of these outlines, 44 concerned “arrest and control,” 47 concerned “force options”
and driving, 164 concerned firearms, and 12 concerned miscellaneous topics related to
force but not apparently required as part of the perishable skills program.
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covered in most of these trainings, court decisions beyond Graham and Garner play a limited role.
The overwhelming majority (75.2%) of in-service training
outlines regarding force offer no description of any Supreme
Court or Ninth Circuit cases interpreting Graham and Garner.164
Another 18% of training outlines reference one or two Ninth Circuit or Supreme Court cases other than Graham or Garner. Just
6.7% of the training materials reference three or more such cases.

164 As Table 2 notes, there are sometimes references to “case law,” and so it is possible
that instructors are teaching additional cases beyond those referenced here. But instructors can only teach officers about these additional cases if they, in turn, are educated about
these cases. As I describe in Part III.B.3, instructor training is similarly sparse on coverage of court opinions.
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TABLE 2: COURT DECISIONS REFERENCED IN IN-SERVICE
TRAINING OUTLINES
Case References

No cases or “case
law” referenced
Reference to
“case law”
Reference to
“case law” and/or
Graham and/or
Garner
Reference to one
Ninth Circuit/
Supreme Court
case other than
Graham and/or
Garner
Reference to two
Ninth Circuit/
Supreme Court
cases other than
Graham and/or
Garner
Reference to
three or more
Ninth Circuit/
Supreme Court
cases other than
Graham and/or
Garner
Total

Arrest
and
Control
Training

Force
Options
Training

Firearms
Training

Misc.
Training

Total

10

2

33

6

4

1

5

0

6

5

126

3

140
(52.4%)

7

21

0

1

29
(10.9%)

13

4

0

2

19
(7.1%)

4

14

0

0

18
(6.7%)

44

47

164

12

267
(100%)

51
(19.1%)
10
(3.7%)

Among the 66 training outlines that do reference one or more
cases applying Graham and/or Garner, just 19 of the 284 Ninth
Circuit and Supreme Court cases that interpret Graham and/or
Garner—described in Part II—make an appearance. Just 6 cases
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account for the vast majority of case references in these 66 training outlines: Forrester v. San Diego, Forrett v. Richardson,165 Reed
v. Hoy,166 Headwaters Forest Defense v. City of Humboldt,167 Bryan
v. McPherson, and Scott v. Henrich.168 So, of the 267 in-service
training outlines that include coverage of the legal standards for
use of force among their objectives, more than three-quarters include no reference to Ninth Circuit or Supreme Court cases that
apply Graham and/or Garner, and among the 66 trainings that do
include cases other than Graham and Garner, just over 2% of the
Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court cases applying Graham and
Garner are referenced.
TABLE 3: IN-SERVICE TRAININGS REFERENCING CASES OTHER
THAN GRAHAM AND GARNER
One
additional
Ninth
Circuit or
Supreme
Court case
Forrester v.
San Diego
Forrett v.
Richardson
Reed v. Hoy
Headwaters
Forest
Defense v.
County of
Humboldt
Bryan v.
McPherson
Scott v.
Henrich

165

Two
additional
Ninth
Circuit or
Supreme
Court cases

Three+
additional
Ninth
Circuit or
Supreme
Court cases

Case coverage
as percentage
of trainings

23

18

14

55 (83.3%)

2

3

10

15 (22.7%)

14

15 (22.7%)

11

2

13 (19.7%)

3

9

13 (19.7%)

13

13 (19.7%)

1

1

112 F.3d 416 (9th Cir. 1997).
909 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1989).
167 276 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2002).
168 39 F.3d 912 (9th Cir. 1994). For further discussion of these cases, see infra notes
173–81 and accompanying text. See also Appendix, supra note 87.
166
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One
additional
Ninth
Circuit or
Supreme
Court case

Brooks v.
Seattle
Deorle v.
Rutherford
Smith v.
Hemet
Saman v.
Robbins
Reynolds v.
County of
San Diego
Vera Cruz
v. City of
Escondido
Chew v.
Gates
Scott v.
Harris
Glenn v.
Washington
Billington
v. Smith
Saucier v.
Katz
Alexander
v. County of
Los Angeles
Young v.
County of
Los Angeles
Total
trainings

1

Two
additional
Ninth
Circuit or
Supreme
Court cases

Three+
additional
Ninth
Circuit or
Supreme
Court cases

Case coverage
as percentage
of trainings

7

7 (10.6%)

1

5

6 (9.1%)

0

5

6 (9.1%)

1

4

5 (7.6%)

4

5 (7.6%)

3

3 (4.5%)

3

3 (4.5%)

1

2 (3%)

2

2 (3%)

1

1 (1.5%)

1

1 (1.5%)

1

1 (1.5%)

1

1
29
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1 (1.5%)
19

18

66

Moreover, among the modest group of in-service training
outlines that describe cases other than Graham or Garner, the
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case descriptions are inconsistent in several ways with the Supreme Court’s expectations about the ways in which officers are
educated about decisions that clearly establish the law. First, although the Court expects that officers are on notice of the underlying facts of the cases and the type of force used, cases are used
in in-service trainings to communicate general legal principles.
Take, for example, the training outline for a “Force Option Simulator” course offered at the Allan Hancock Community College
Public Safety Training Complex.169
FIGURE 3: FORCE OPTION SIMULATOR TRAINING OUTLINE, ALLAN
HANCOCK COLLEGE170

169 Allan Hancock Community College offers basic and advanced officer training, and
cosponsors some trainings with local law enforcement agencies. For further information
about their training programs, see Law Enforcement Training, ALLAN HANCOCK COLL.,
https://perma.cc/S58K-CMEX.
170 ALLAN HANCOCK COLL., SELF-DEFENSE FIREARMS TRAINING: FORCE OPTION
SIMULATOR OUTLINE 2–3 (on file with author).
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The outline discusses several cases—including Graham, Henrich, Forrester, and Bryan. But none of these descriptions concern
the courts’ application of Graham to the facts of the cases. In Henrich, the Ninth Circuit concluded that officers had not used excessive force when they shot a man after he pointed a gun at them.
But the underlying facts of the case are not included in Allan Hancock Community College’s in-service training outline; instead, the
case is invoked for the principle that “officers do not necessarily
need to use the least intrusive force.”171 Similarly, facts about the
injuries to the plaintiff and the distance between the plaintiff and
officer when he was tased were among the reasons the Ninth Circuit concluded in Isayeva that Bryan did not clearly establish the
unlawfulness of Deputy Barry’s conduct.172 But Allan Hancock
Community College’s course outline contains none of those factual particularities about Bryan, upon which Deputy Barry is assumed to have had notice.
In addition, the cases selected for attention during trainings—and the ways in which those cases are used—do not appear
to illuminate the boundaries of officers’ constitutional power to
use force. The Supreme Court has explained that “[p]recedent involving similar facts can help move a case beyond the otherwise
‘hazy border between excessive and acceptable force’ and thereby
provide an officer notice that a specific use of force is unlawful.”173
But many of the cases most frequently invoked during trainings—
including Forrester, Forrett, Henrich, and Reed—are used to communicate the notion that officers can constitutionally use more
force than necessary, so long as it was reasonable.174 For example,
Forrester is referenced in trainings for the proposition that the
“[l]evel of force used does not have to be least intrusive, only reasonable.”175 Forrett is described in trainings as standing for the
proposition that “[d]eadly force may be used to prevent the escape
of an individual when an officer has ‘probable cause to believe
that the infliction or threatened infliction of serious harm is
171

Id. at 2.
Isayeva, 872 F.3d at 948.
173 Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1153 (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 312 (2015)).
174 The other two most often-cited cases are Bryan and Headwaters, described infra
text accompanying notes 180–81.
175 SAN BERNARDINO CNTY. SHERIFF’S DEP’T, DRIVING/FORCE OPTIONS SIMULATOR
TRAINING PROGRAM—PSP: EXPANDED COURSE OUTLINE 8 (on file with author); see also
ALLAN HANCOCK COLL., supra note 169, at 3; CORONA POLICE DEP’T, FORCE OPTIONS
SIMULATOR COURSE OUTLINE 2 (on file with author).
172
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involved’” and “[o]fficers are not required to exhaust every alternative before using justifiable deadly force.”176 Henrich is referenced in trainings for the proposition that “[o]fficers do not necessarily need to use the least intrusive force” and that the “[f]orce
must be reasonable and justified.”177 And Reed is described in
trainings as standing for the proposition that “[p]olice need not
retreat.”178
Moreover, qualified immunity doctrine assumes that officers
are aware of multiple cases involving similar force under similar
circumstances, and are able to distinguish between the facts and
holdings of those cases when deciding what force is appropriate.179
But the in-service training outlines I reviewed never used multiple cases to illuminate the limits of constitutionally acceptable
force. Bryan is used in some trainings to illustrate the proposition
that tasers are an “intermediate or medium level of force, and officers must give a warning when feasible.”180 Headwaters is used
in some trainings to explain that police “[c]annot use [pepper
spray] against non-violent protestors.”181 But I found no in-service
training describing multiple cases involving one type of force and
the ways in which those decisions clarified the scope of officers’
power.
176 VENTURA CNTY. SHERIFF’S OFF., FORCE OPTION SIMULATOR EXPANDED COURSE
OUTLINE 3 (on file with author); see also SAN JOSE POLICE DEP’T, SAN JOSE P.D. FIREARMS
INSTRUCTOR COURSE: EXPANDED COURSE OUTLINE 10 (2020) (on file with author) (explaining Forrett stands for the proposition that “[i]t is not necessary that the suspect be armed
at the time of the deadly force application, or threatened an officer with a weapon” and
that deadly force can be used to prevent escape when an officer has “probable cause to
believe that the infliction or threatened infliction of serious harm is involved” (quotation
marks omitted)).
177 See SELF-DEFENSE FIREARMS TRAINING, FORCE OPTIONS SIMULATOR COURSE
OUTLINE 2 (on file with author); see also TULARE CNTY. SHERIFF’S OFF., FORCE OPTION
SIMULATOR OUTLINE: T.I. TRAINING SIMULATOR 3 (2020) (on file with author); RIVERSIDE
CNTY. SHERIFF’S DEP’T, FORCE OPTIONS SIMULATOR INSTRUCTOR COURSE: EXPANDED
COURSE OUTLINE 10 (2009–2010) (on file with author).
178 See SELF-DEFENSE FIREARMS TRAINING, supra note 177, at 3 (on file with author);
see also RIVERSIDE CNTY. SHERIFF’S DEP’T, supra note 177, at 10 (citing Reed for the proposition that “[o]fficers cannot, while using lawful (reasonable) force, lose their right to self
defense: in making an arrest, overcoming resistance, and preventing escape” (emphasis in
original)).
179 See, e,g., Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1152–53 (explaining that cases can help clarify for
officers the “hazy border between excessive and acceptable force” (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 312)).
180 SANTA ANA POLICE DEP’T, FORCE OPTION SIMULATOR PSP: EXTENDED COURSE
OUTLINE 5 (on file with author).
181 S.F. SHERIFF’S DEP’T, FORCE OPTIONS SIMULATOR COURSE: EXPANDED COURSE
OUTLINE 7 (2019) (on file with author).
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Finally, when officers are taught through examples about the
limits of their authority to use force, those examples do not appear
to be drawn from court decisions. Consider, for example, a training outline provided by the Hermosa Beach Police Department
about officers’ options when using force. The training outline describes the holdings of Graham and Garner. Then, it describes a
portion of the training where time is spent with officers in small
groups considering a series of hypotheticals that read, in part, as
follows:
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: You watch a female slap a male’s
face during an argument. The male tells you he wants to
press “full charges” against her. She tells you, “You’re not
taking me to jail,” while clenching her fists and taking a
fighting stance. No weapon is seen. What do you do?
BURGLARY: Officers respond to a residential burglary inprogress. During a building search, they find a male in the
kitchen. As soon as officers enter the kitchen, the suspect
grabs a cheese grater and assaults one of the officers. What
do you do?
BLOCK PARTY: Units are assigned to watch a block party
because two neighbors had a heated argument on social
media. While you’re watching the party, a shooting occurs
with several victims. The shooting pauses as the gunman is
reloading. What do you do?
INTOXICATED PERSON: An uninvited guest at a party is
refusing to leave, and appears to be under the influence of an
intoxicating substance. He is naked and spraying himself
with a water hose. He has a blank stare and is pacing back
and forth. He is 6 feet tall, 250 pounds and there are many
potential weapons in the area around him. He is not agitated,
but he also doesn’t notice you are present. What do you do?182
I found several similar training outlines in which officers are
asked how they would respond to various situations that might

182 See HERMOSA BEACH POLICE DEP’T, FORCE OPTION SIMULATOR PSP CATEGORY 1:
EXTENDED COURSE OUTLINE 6 (2018) (on file with author).
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lead to the use of force. In none of these in-service training outlines
were the scenarios identified as based on court decisions.183
Overall, these outlines suggest that during in-service training—as during basic training—officers are taught general legal
principles drawn from Graham and/or Garner and, infrequently,
a few additional cases. To the extent that officers are given the
opportunity to explore the limits of their power to use force, hypotheticals are used instead of the facts and holdings of court decisions applying Graham and Garner, with no guidance about
courts’ adjudication of the constitutionality of force under the circumstances.
3. Instructor training.
In addition to reviewing basic training and in-service training outlines, I also reviewed forty-one instructor training outlines
regarding use of force—the outlines used to train the trainers who
then conduct in-service trainings. Understanding what trainers
know about cases interpreting Graham and Garner is important
to gain a complete picture of the role these decisions might play
in officers’ in-service trainings. It could be, for example, that
trainers know about additional use-of-force cases and then instruct officers about these cases, even if they are not referenced
by name in the in-service training outlines. But the outlines used
for instructor training are similarly sparse on court decisions applying Graham and Garner.

183 For further discussion of the ways in which law enforcement officers are trained
about their authority to use force, see generally Ion Meyn, Police Use of Force and Resisting Accountability, 2021 WIS. L. REV. (forthcoming) (draft on file with author).
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TABLE 4: COURT DECISIONS REFERENCED IN INSTRUCTOR
TRAINING OUTLINES
Cases Referenced
No cases or “case law” referenced
Reference to “case law”
Reference to “case law” and/or Graham and/or Garner
Reference to one Ninth Circuit/Supreme Court case
applying Graham and/or Garner
Reference to two Ninth Circuit/Supreme Court cases
applying Graham and/or Garner
Reference to three or more Ninth Circuit/Supreme
Court cases applying Graham and/or Garner
Totals

Number of
Outlines (%)
12 (29.3%)
5 (12.2%)
11 (26.8%)
1 (2.4%)
5 (12.2%)
7 (17.1%)
41 (100%)

A higher percentage of instructor trainings (31.7%) than inservice trainings (24.7%) included a reference to cases applying
Graham and Garner. But the vast majority of cases referenced in
the thirteen instructors’ training outlines that did reference useof-force cases other than Graham and Garner were the same as
those cases referenced in the in-service trainings. Just 5 cases referenced in the instructor training outlines were not also referenced in the in-service training, and each of these cases were referenced in fewer than 5% of the 41 instructor trainings I
reviewed.
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TABLE 5: CASE COVERAGE IN THE INSTRUCTOR TRAININGS
REFERENCING CASES OTHER THAN GRAHAM AND GARNER
One
additional
Ninth
Circuit or
Supreme
Court case
Scott v.
Henrich
Forrett v.
Richardson
Reed v. Hoy
Forrester v.
San Diego
Reynolds v.
County of
San Diego
Smith v.
City of
Hemet
Brooks v.
Seattle
Bryan v.
McPherson
Young v.
County of
Los Angeles
City &
County of
San Francisco v.
Sheehan
LaLonde v.
County of
Riverside

Two
additional
Ninth
Circuit or
Supreme
Court cases

Three+
additional
Ninth
Circuit or
Supreme
Court cases

Case
coverage as
percentage
of trainings

3

8

11 (84.6%)

3

4

7 (53.8%)

7

7 (53.8%)

6

6 (46.2%)

4

4 (30.8%)

3

3 (23.1%)

3

3 (23.1%)

3

3 (23.1%)

2

2 (15.4%)

2

2 (15.4%)

2

2 (15.4%)
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One
additional
Ninth
Circuit or
Supreme
Court case

Saman v.
Robbins
Tatum v.
City &
County of
San Francisco
Deorle v.
Rutherford
Mattos v.
Agarano
Headwaters
Forest
Defense v.
County of
Humboldt
Saucier v.
Katz
Scott v.
Harris
Chew v.
Gates
Ting v.
United
States
Total
trainings

Two
additional
Ninth
Circuit or
Supreme
Court cases

Three+
additional
Ninth
Circuit or
Supreme
Court cases

Case
coverage as
percentage
of trainings

2

2 (15.4%)

2

2 (15.4%)

2

2 (15.4%)

2

2 (15.4%)

2

2 (15.4%)

2

2 (15.4%)

2

2 (15.4%)

1

1 (7.7%)

1
1
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1 (7.7%)
5

7

13 (100%)

Moreover, as with the basic trainings and in-service trainings, the instructor trainings used court decisions to describe general principles related to the constitutionality of uses of force,
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then used hypotheticals not drawn from cases to illustrate the
boundaries of constitutional conduct.184
4. Supplemental trainings and videos.
Apart from the trainings set out in the outlines on California
POST’s website, there are various supplemental training materials about the constitutionality of uses of force that California
officers may be able to access. Yet these materials reflect similar
inattention to court decisions applying Graham and Garner.
For example, Lexipol has daily training bulletins that it provides its subscribers in California and across the country. It also
has longer training videos that it markets through a website
called Police1.185 Lexipol informed me that, in creating those bulletins and videos, it “rarely, if ever, develops training as a result
of case decisions from district or appellate courts.”186 Instead, Lexipol appears to use various hypothetical factual scenarios—not
drawn from cases—to have officers consider the limits of reasonable
force.187
Lexipol’s failure to include court decisions in their daily training bulletins and videos is not an oversight—it is a choice. My
request for information from Lexipol specifically asked whether
they train officers based on a series of Ninth Circuit summary
judgment decisions published between 2017 and 2019 that applied Graham and concluded that the plaintiff has offered evidence sufficient to establish a constitutional violation in a variety
of circumstances—precisely the types of decisions that the Supreme Court says can clearly establish the law. The Vice President of Product Management responded unequivocally that Lexipol does not create trainings based on these types of cases. He
184 See, e.g., L.A. POLICE DEP’T, FORCE OPTION SIMULATOR INSTRUCTOR 6 (on file with
author) (containing hypotheticals about the use of force against a motorist whose license
plate suggests the driver is armed and dangerous, a member of a “gang party” who points
a handgun at an officer, a “possible mentally ill person” and a burglary suspect who has
“a shiny object in his hand.”).
185 Police1 Landing Page, LEXIPOL, https://perma.cc/7WRF-SVBL.
186 E-mail from Tim Kensok, Vice President of Prod. Mgmt., Lexipol, to Joanna C.
Schwartz (May 4, 2020, 2:46 PM); see also E-mail from Tim Kensok, supra note 138 (clarifying that his descriptions of their trainings, and the lack of appellate case law in those
trainings, applies both to their two-minute trainings and to their Police1 Academy
library).
187 See, e.g., Torrance Police Dep’t, Daily Training Bulletin, Canines, (May 18, 2020)
(describing a use-of-force hypothetical involving a canine) (on file with author); see also
Meyn, supra note 183 (manuscript at 24–30) (describing Lexipol’s training videos).
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wrote, after consulting with Bruce D. Praet, the cofounder of Lexipol, that:
[W]e base our training on Supreme Court precedent (currently Graham v. Connor) and any statutory law applicable
in a particular state. . . . The bottom line is that, while Lexipol will continue to consider regional case laws with respect
to updating policy, Lexipol has not based any of its training
on any of the Ninth Circuit cases cited [in my request].188
In other words, in the view of Lexipol’s vice president for product
development and its cofounder, police officers need no further judicial guidance beyond Graham regarding the constitutional
bounds of their power to use force. Instead, the Graham framework
is sufficient for officers to learn and then apply in the factually
distinct circumstances they invariably confront.
Finally, California POST has online trainings that they have
certified to meet their in-service requirements. Although I was
not given access to these videos, I was informed by the organization that “[t]he vast majority of the online courses do not rely on
case law decisions.”189
D. Government Attorneys
California law enforcement officers might also learn about
use-of-force cases from government attorneys. But, based on my
correspondence with two district attorneys’ offices and seven city
attorneys’ offices in California, it appears that these government
offices are not regularly educating officers about the facts and
holdings of use-of-force cases that the Supreme Court deems necessary to clearly establish the law.
When Professor Charles Weisselberg examined how officers
are instructed about their requirements under Miranda v. Arizona,190 he found that district attorneys’ offices sometimes offered
legal briefings or trainings.191 But the district attorneys I contacted
reported that they do not offer briefings on use-of-force cases. The
Office of the Alameda County District Attorney’s Office has an
188

E-mail from Tim Kensok, supra note 186.
E-mail from Phil Caporale, Bureau Chief, Strategic Commc’ns & Rsch. Bureau,
Comm’n on Peace Officer Standards and Training, to Joanna C. Schwartz (Feb. 20, 2020,
9:34 AM).
190 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
191 See Weisselberg, supra note 114, at 1143–48.
189
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online collection of “recent cases,” but my review of these cases
and notes suggest that the District Attorney is only reporting on
cases describing the constitutionality of interrogations, searches,
and seizures.192 Similarly, the Los Angeles District Attorneys’ office produces one-minute briefings on legal topics, but reported in
response to my public records request that those briefings “don’t
generally cover force law cases or topics.”193
City or county attorneys—whose offices represent government defendants in civil suits—could also advise law enforcement
agencies and officers about the facts and holdings of court decisions applying Graham and Garner. Of the seven city and county
attorneys’ offices I queried, three reported that any communications they have with their police department clients are privileged,194 two provided me with use-of-force briefing materials that
included no references to or descriptions of court opinions,195 and
two—the Los Angeles County Attorney’s office and the San Diego
City Attorney’s office—provided me with materials that

192 See Recent Cases, OFF. OF THE ALAMEDA CNTY. DIST. ATT’Y, https://perma.cc/8L92U37L. Note also that these online posts concern only a subset of cases that might clearly
establish the law regarding interrogations, searches, and seizures, as well.
193 See E-mail from William Frayeh, Captain, L.A. Cnty. Dist. Att’y Admin. Div., to
Joanna C. Schwartz (May 1, 2020, 1:02 PM) (on file with author) (“Since the 1MB [Oneminute Briefings] are primarily designed to provide prosecutorial and investigative training to our prosecutors and investigators (though 1MBs are also shared by email with about
4500 outside agencies/individuals who have asked to receive them), use of force by officers
is not within the mission.”).
194 See, e.g., E-mail from Bethelwel Wilson, L.A. City Att’y’s Off., to Joanna C.
Schwartz (May 15, 2020, 9:06 AM) (on file with author) (reporting that the Los Angeles
City Attorney’s office does not produce publicly available briefings, but does “have a few
advice letters to LAPD that would be responsive to [my] request but they fall under the
attorney work product and attorney-client privileges”); E-mail from Susana Alcala Wood,
City Att’y, City of Sacramento, to Joanna C. Schwartz (May 20, 2020, 3:07 PM) (claiming
“a confidential attorney-client relationship in every aspect of the interactions between the
police department and the city attorney’s office” such that “every writing prepared by this
office in the service of the confidential attorney-client relationship, is a confidential, privileged document”); E-mail from Carmen O. Merino, Gen. Couns.—Police, City of Glendale,
to Joanna C. Schwartz (June 10, 2020, 12:35 PM) (“[T]he City Attorney’s Office does write
case summaries for the Command Staff. These records are protected by attorney-client
privilege.”).
195 See, e.g., E-mail from Viridiana Gallardo-King, Deputy City Att’y, City Att’y of
Bakersfield, to Joanna C. Schwartz (May 18, 2020, 9:05 AM) (explaining that her office
does “provide summaries of cases,” but that she “was unable to locate any regarding use
of force”); E-mail from Diane Grant, Senior Off. Assistant, City of San Bernardino City
Clerk’s Off., to Joanna C. Schwartz (May 21, 2020, 12:15 PM) (confirming that the City
Attorney’s Office “do[es] not have any documents that are responsive” to my request for
case summaries or other materials regarding court decisions).
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referenced use-of-force cases. But even the materials from Los Angeles County and San Diego would not educate officers about the
facts and holdings of decisions that clearly establish the law for
qualified immunity purposes.
PowerPoint presentations provided to me by the San Diego
City Attorney’s Office included references to a handful of cases,
primarily from the Supreme Court, but did not offer details about
the uses of force in these decisions that would be relevant to qualified immunity analyses. Instead, these discussions focused on
the importance of qualified immunity for government attorneys
and general language in recent Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit
cases about the qualified immunity standard.
For example, in one presentation about civil liability for supervisors, the City Attorney’s Office referenced a recent Ninth
Circuit case, S.B. v. County of San Diego,196 in which qualified immunity was granted.197 The slide quotes language from the Ninth
Circuit decision, noting that the court granted qualified immunity
because the plaintiff had not met the “exacting standard” set by
the Supreme Court’s recent qualified immunity decisions.
FIGURE 4: SAN DIEGO CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE SLIDE
PRESENTATION198

But the slide presentation does not reference the Ninth Circuit’s holding in S.B. that a reasonable jury could find that the

196

864 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2017).
See id. at 1017.
198 San Diego City Att’y’s Office, Civil Division, PowerPoint on Civil Liability (May
26, 2020).
197
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officer’s “use of deadly force was not objectively reasonable,” or
include the Ninth Circuit’s detailed description of the underlying
facts that supported its conclusion.199
Materials provided by the Los Angeles County Counsel include several PowerPoint presentations that reference Graham,
Garner, and a handful of Ninth Circuit decisions that appear in
training materials.200 Like the training outlines I reviewed, these
PowerPoint presentations describe the holdings of court decisions
without detailed descriptions of their underlying facts, and emphasize expansive descriptions of officers’ authority.201
The Los Angeles County materials also include newsletters
disseminated by the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department Field Operations Support Services. One of these newsletters describes in
detail the facts and holdings of a Ninth Circuit decision, Thompson v. Rahr,202 which held that it was objectively unreasonable to
point a loaded gun at an unarmed suspect’s head but granted
qualified immunity because there was not a prior case with

199

S.B., 864 F.3d at 1014:

[A] reasonable jury could conclude that: (1) the three officers, responding to a
call about a mentally ill and intoxicated individual ‘acting aggressively,’ entered
Brown’s house and saw that he had knives in his pockets; (2) after Brown complied with the officers’ orders to kneel, Brown grabbed a knife with a six-to-eightinch blade from his back pocket; (3) Moses shot Brown as soon as his hand
touched the knife; (4) Brown was on his knees when he was shot; (5) when he
grabbed the knife, Brown was approximately six to eight feet away from Vories;
(6) Moses could not see the other officers at the time Brown grabbed the knife;
(7) after Brown went for the knife, the officers did not order him to drop the knife
or warn that he was about to be shot; and (8) Vories had a non-lethal option—a
Taser gun.
200 See E-mail from Jahel Saucedo, Sheriff’s Servs. Div. Legal Advisory Unit, L.A.
Cnty., to Joanna C. Schwartz (Sept. 22, 2020, 4:23 PM) (providing dozens of attachments
in response to my request for materials provided by County Counsel’s office to the Los
Angeles Sheriff’s Department, including PowerPoint presentations describing the holdings of Graham, Garner, and a selection of Ninth Circuit cases).
201 See, e.g., L.A. Cnty. Couns., PowerPoint on Training and Instructing (describing
the holdings of several cases including Forrester, Young v. County of Los Angeles, 655 F.3d
1156 (9th Cir. 2011), and Headwaters) (on file with author); L.A. Cnty. Couns. & L.A.
Sheriff’s Dep’t, PowerPoint on Force Training Unit (on file with author) (setting out various bases for “reasonable suspicion for pat down” based on prior court decisions, and emphasizing “[w]e must have at least grounds to detain in order to use reportable force!”).
One PowerPoint does go into detail about the facts and holding of Graham. See L.A. Cnty.
Couns., PowerPoint on Use-of-Force Training on Federal and State Law (on file with
author).
202 885 F.3d 582 (9th Cir. 2018).
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sufficiently similar facts.203 The newsletter explains that force under the circumstances was not objectively reasonable because “the
deputy had an unarmed felony suspect under control, the suspect
could have been easily handcuffed while he was sitting on the
bumper of the patrol vehicle, and the suspect was not in close
proximity to an accessible weapon,” and emphasizes that, although the officer in this case received qualified immunity, “qualified immunity would be in jeopardy should a similar incident occur today.”204 This is the sort of case analysis that would,
conceivably, educate officers about the scope of clearly established
law—assuming they were given this newsletter or told about its
contents.205 But this is the only Ninth Circuit decision applying
Graham and Garner that appears with this type of detail in Los
Angeles County Counsel’s materials or, for that matter, in the
materials I received from any law enforcement or government
agency.
E. Legal Updates
Law enforcement officers might also learn about cases clearly
establishing the law from newsletters or video broadcasts. California POST used to conduct “a monthly satellite video broadcast
with case law updates” that could be downloaded by law enforcement agencies across the state206 and published a legal update

203 See Thompson v. Copeland: Excessive Force and Qualified Immunity, FIELD
OPERATIONS SUPPORT SERVS. NEWSL. (L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, Los Angeles, C.A.), at 1–
3 (on file with author). Note that the newsletter references this case as Thompson v.
Copeland, but the case is actually Thompson v. Rahr. For further information about Rahr,
see Appendix, supra note 87. The Field Operations Support Services Newsletter described
one additional case—Hayes v. County of San Diego, 57 Cal. 4th 622 (2013)—that established for the first time that “liability for negligence may arise from tactical conduct and
decisions employed by law enforcement officers preceding the use of deadly force when
viewed as part of the totality of circumstances.” Hayes v. County of San Diego, TRAINING
BUREAU NEWSL. (L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, Los Angeles, C.A.), June 18, 2014, at 1. This
case does not interpret Graham and Garner but, instead, should be understood as a watershed case that established a new standard for negligence claims under California law.
For evidence that other California agencies have instructed their officers about Hayes and
changed policies and trainings as a result, see Healy, supra note 114.
204 FIELD OPERATIONS SUPPORT SERVS. NEWSL., supra note 203, at 2.
205 See E-mail from Roger Clark, Police Pracs. Expert, to Joanna C. Schwartz (Oct.
10, 2020, 3:02 PM) (on file with author) (explaining that Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department
Field Operations Support Services newsletters “relay information to the department about
training changes/issues” and that “[c]opies are given to Sgt’s and Lt’s (and in the briefing
book) at stations and they would brief the troops at briefing”).
206 Weisselberg, supra note 114, at 1136.
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each January.207 These broadcasts and publications might have
provided information about the facts and holdings of use-of-force
cases.208 But California POST stopped creating the monthly video
series and discontinued the annual legal updates in 2018.209
In recent years, there has been a proliferation of websites
with information of interest to police department officials, including, sometimes, summaries of court decisions.210 These sites do at
times describe the facts and holdings of use-of-force cases. But
these sites make no effort to educate subscribers about the hundreds or thousands of decisions that might clearly establish the
law for qualified immunity purposes. And there is no way to know
the extent to which California officers actually take advantage of
these resources. There is no requirement that California officers
subscribe to these newsletters, and no way to know how often
those who subscribe to the newsletters actually read them.
***
Qualified immunity shields officers from liability unless prior
court cases have held factually analogous conduct to be unconstitutional. The Supreme Court’s insistence that only factually
analogous cases can clearly establish the law is premised on the
notion that officers know about the facts and holdings of these
cases. But, as this Part has shown, the hundreds of Supreme
Court and Ninth Circuit cases interpreting Graham and Garner
play a very limited role in California law enforcement policies and
trainings. Just a handful of use-of-force cases other than Graham
and Garner are ever discussed with officers or included in trainings or other educational materials. And, when these cases are
referenced, officers are almost never provided with information
about the precise nature of force used or the underlying circumstances in these cases. Instead, use-of-force decisions are invoked
207 E-mail from Phil Caporale, Bureau Chief, Strategic Commc’ns & Rsch. Bureau,
Comm’n on Peace Officer Standards and Training, to Joanna C. Schwartz (Feb. 18, 2020,
2:31 PM) (on file with author).
208 Weisselberg, supra note 114, at 1137–39 (describing information in the videos
about court decisions relevant to Miranda requirements).
209 Caporale, supra note 198.
210 See, e.g., The Monday Morning Memo, ASS’N OF DEPUTY DIST. ATT’YS,
https://perma.cc/83P2-GPN9; James R. Touchstone, CPOA Case Summaries – March 2020,
CAL. PEACE OFFICERS’ ASS’N (Apr. 15, 2020), https://perma.cc/BG28-XM8G; Legal Update
– August 2019 Case Summaries, DAIGLE L. GRP. (Sept. 10, 2019),
https://perma.cc/WB6Y-KYUP.
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for general principles that build on Graham and Garner, and generally describe officers’ power to use force in expansive terms.
Training outlines may include various scenarios that can help officers understand the boundaries of constitutional conduct—but
these scenarios do not appear to be based on court decisions.
IV. THE ROLE OF CASE LAW IN OFFICERS’ DECISIONMAKING
I have shown that California police officers are not taught
about the facts of the hundreds or thousands of cases that can be
used to clearly establish the law. These findings undermine a key
assumption underlying the Supreme Court’s qualified immunity
jurisprudence. One might conclude, based on these findings, that
officers simply need to be better educated about the facts and
holdings of court opinions. Yet, as I explain in this Part, even if
law enforcement relied more heavily on court decisions to educate
their officers about the constitutional limits of force, the expectations of notice and reliance baked into qualified immunity doctrine would still be unrealistic. First, it would be impossible to
educate officers about the facts and holdings of all of the cases
that could clearly establish the law. Second, even if officers were
educated about more court decisions, those decisions would remain but one small part of officers’ understanding about the scope
of their authority. And, third, even if officers were educated about
and retained the facts and holdings of these court decisions, it is
highly unlikely that officers would actually reflect on those court
opinions when deciding whether and how to use force.
A. The Challenge of Learning Clearly Established Law
Currently, California officers learn little to nothing about the
facts and holdings of court decisions applying Graham and Garner that clearly establish the law for the purposes of qualified immunity. But even if significantly more time were taken to educate
officers about these court decisions, it is unrealistic to imagine
that officers could be trained about the hundreds or thousands of
court decisions that clearly establish the law.
Consider how long it would take to educate officers about the
284 Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit decisions applying Graham
and Garner described in Part II. If trainers spent just 5 minutes
describing the facts and holdings of each case, it would take 1,420
minutes—almost 24 hours—to educate officers about these Ninth
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Circuit use-of-force cases. At least as much time would need to be
spent learning about use-of-force cases from other circuits and
district courts. Then, officers would need to learn about other
types of cases—analyzing the scope of officers’ constitutional authority to stop, frisk, search, and arrest, among other powers. And
the number of cases clearly establishing the law in all of these
jurisdictions and in all of these types of cases increases by the
year. California officers could dedicate every minute of their currently required in-service training hours to learning about court
decisions, and still not have enough time to spend five minutes on
each court decision that could clearly establish the law for qualified immunity purposes.
One might conclude that the answer is simply for police departments to dedicate significantly more time to in-service training.211 But even if significantly more time were dedicated to studying court opinions, it is inconceivable that officers could retain
the facts and holdings of all of the hundreds or thousands of cases
that clearly establish the law. Any law student or litigator knows
how difficult it is to keep in mind the facts and holdings of dozens
of court opinions before an exam or oral argument. Indeed, the
reader might find it difficult to remember the taser cases described just a few pages ago that were analyzed by the Ninth Circuit in Isayeva, and the factual distinctions between them—regarding the taser mode used, the number of times the people were
tased, the injuries suffered by the people tased, the distance of
the officers to the people tased, the relative size of the people
tased to the officers who tased them, and the nature of the resistance.212 Now imagine keeping in mind the facts and holdings
of hundreds or thousands of opinions that could clearly establish
the law. No matter how much time is dedicated to the study of
court decisions, it is unrealistic to imagine that law enforcement

211 For arguments that police need additional training and suggestions for the types
of topics to cover, see, for example, Kirk Burkhalter, Retired Officer: Give Police a Real
Education Before Putting Them on the Streets, USA TODAY (June 11, 2020),
https://perma.cc/KA55-5D7L (arguing that “police academies should replace the standard
five to six months of training with a two-year curriculum” and describing the components
of the proposed training); POLICE EXEC. RSCH. F., supra note 114, at 9 (reporting, based on
a national survey, that “agencies spend a median of 58 hours of recruit training on firearms
and another 49 hours on defensive tactics” but “spend only about 8 hours of recruit training each on the topics of de-escalation, crisis intervention, and Electronic Control Weapons” and that “[a] similar imbalance was noted with in-service training”).
212 See supra notes 91–111 and accompanying text.
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officers—or anyone, for that matter—could keep in mind hundreds or thousands of cases at the level of detail that guides
courts’ qualified immunity analysis in decisions like Isayeva.213
B. The Limited Role of Case Law in Police Education
The implausibility of the Court’s assumption that officers
could know about the facts and holdings of cases that clearly establish the law becomes even more obvious when one considers
the many types of information—beyond court opinions—that police officers regularly receive about the scope of their authority.
Police policies regarding the legal bounds of force account for
just one small portion of police department manuals that are hundreds of pages long and cover a wide range of subjects. Lexipol’s
manual, for example, is over five hundred pages long and has ten
chapters concerning general operations, patrol operations, traffic
operations, and investigation operations.214 In the general operations chapter of Lexipol’s manual, which includes its use-of-force
policy, there are dozens of additional topics including search and
seizure, domestic violence, report preparation, identity theft, biological samples, and more. Currently, references to Graham and
Garner—and for a handful of jurisdictions, one or two additional
cases—make up just one small part of the policies officers must
internalize. Even if departments incorporated more court opinions into their use-of-force policies, those decisions would still constitute just one small part of the policies guiding officer behavior.
Legal restrictions on officers’ power to use force currently
play a similarly limited role in police trainings. California POST
requires that recruits undergo at least 664 hours of basic training,
with just 16—2.4% of those hours—dedicated to the use of force
and de-escalation.215 Moreover, just a small portion of the 16 hours
dedicated to the use of force and de-escalation focus on legal restrictions—trainers also cover principles of de-escalation,

213 In the Supreme Court’s view, this challenge would be even more difficult for police
officers who have not been trained in the law. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 70
(2011) (explaining that “attorneys, unlike police officers, are equipped with the tools to
find, interpret, and apply legal principles”).
214 See generally, e.g., ELK GROVE POLICE DEP’T, ELK GROVE POLICE DEPARTMENT
POLICY MANUAL (on file with author).
215 See Regular Basic Course Training Specifications: Regular Basic Course Minimum
Hourly Requirements, CAL. COMM’N ON PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS AND TRAINING,
https://perma.cc/MQ4H-VKKK.
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decision-making, the range of force options, and reporting use-offorce incidents, among other topics.216 Legal restrictions on the
use of force play a similarly modest role in in-service trainings.
Officers are required to receive 24 hours of training every 2 years,
including a minimum of 12 hours of “perishable skills” training.217
Legal issues related to the use of force are required topics for some
“perishable skills” trainings.218 But these trainings cover many
other topics in tactics and skills that are unmoored to legal
standards.
The time allotted to discussion of legal requirements and
court decisions during police officers’ trainings must also be considered against the backdrop of the many hundreds of hours each
year police are not receiving trainings or education—hours spent
in the station house, on patrol, and responding to calls for service.219 As others have observed, these on-the-job experiences and
interactions may be more influential than the guidance disseminated in training facilities.220 Indeed, some field studies of police
behavior have noted that officers are given the message that what
occurs during training has little relevance to their conduct on the
street.221 Regardless of whether officers are given that message,
officers are likely to log many more hours considering the “hazy
216 Regular Basic Course Training Specifications: LD 20 Use of Force/Deescalation,
CAL. COMM’N ON PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS AND TRAINING, https://perma.cc/MQ4H-VKKK.
217 Required Updated or Refresher Training Requirements, CAL. COMM’N ON PEACE
OFFICER STANDARDS AND TRAINING, https://perma.cc/AQ6X-B8TQ.
218 See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
219 See Jeff Asher & Ben Horwitz, How Do the Police Actually Spend Their Time?,
N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2020), https://perma.cc/67TB-57P4 (discussing how the time police
spend on violent crime is quite small relative to “complaints, traffic accidents and noncriminal disturbances”).
220 See, e.g., Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453, 514 (2004) (explaining that, based on the advice of their field
training officers, “[r]ookies are quickly led to believe that . . . the training they received [at
the academy] was irrelevant to the realities of policing, and that they will learn what they
need to know on the street” (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Robert W. Worden, The
Causes of Police Brutality, in POLICE VIOLENCE: UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING
POLICE ABUSE OF FORCE 29 (William A. Geller & Hans Toch eds., 1996)); Kit Kinports,
Culpability, Deterrence, and the Exclusionary Rule, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 821, 833–
34 (2013) (explaining how police culture involves unique informal norms that determine
police conduct on the streets); JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 213–23 (3d
ed. 1994) (describing observational field data that suggests “norms located within police
organization are more powerful than court decisions in shaping police behavior”); SAMUEL
WALKER, THE NEW WORLD OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY 21–29 (2005) (describing the failures of law enforcement to implement their own standards in the context of the police
professionalization movement).
221 See Armacost, supra note 220, at 514 nn.376, 377 (citing studies).
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border between excessive and acceptable force” on the job rather
than in the classroom.222
Police department trainings and educational materials could
certainly make better use of the facts and holdings of court decisions. In other fields, including medicine, closed court cases are
regularly used as training tools.223 I have argued that police departments should similarly use information revealed in lawsuits
brought against them and their officers as a means of learning
about error and improving policies and trainings.224 Court decisions could also be used by policy makers and trainers to provide
guidance to officers about the scope of their power.225 But even if
significantly more time was spent educating police officers about
the facts and holdings of court decisions that clearly establish the
law, those decisions would continue to be just one source of information communicated to officers about the limits of their authority.
C. Officers’ Ability to Recall Court Decisions on the Job
Even if officers were somehow taught about the facts and
holdings of all the cases that could clearly establish the law, and
even if officers could somehow retain information about the details of these cases, there is no reason to believe that officers could
analogize to and distinguish from the facts and holdings of these
cases when deciding whether to use force. Decades of research
about the causes of human error make clear that it is difficult for
people to process complex information when making decisions in
times of high speed and stress.226 For that reason, those seeking
to reduce error in aviation, medicine, and other fields have relied
on checklists and other interventions that reduce the number of
variables people have to consider on the job.227
222

Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1153.
See Joanna C. Schwartz, Introspection Through Litigation, 90 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1055, 1056, 1058, 1082–83 (2015).
224 See id. at 1101–03.
225 For these and other benefits of litigation as a source of information and transparency, see generally ALEXANDRA D. LAHAV, IN PRAISE OF LITIGATION 56–83 (2017). See also
Alexandra D. Lahav, The Roles of Litigation in American Democracy, 65 EMORY L.J. 1657,
1683–90 (2016).
226 For discussion of this research, see Joanna C. Schwartz, Systems Failures in Policing, 51 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 535, 538–45 (2018).
227 See, e.g., Atul Gawande, The Checklist, NEW YORKER (Dec. 3, 2007),
https://perma.cc/RV5A-MJ3A (describing the role of checklists in medicine to reduce line
infections in intensive care units). For a discussion of the ways in which checklists could
be used to reduce error in policing, see Schwartz, supra note 226, at 550–52.
223
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In the moments leading up to a use of force, police officers
must process dizzying amounts of information about the circumstances unfolding around them and the possible approaches and
tactics they could employ.228 As one illustration of the complexity
of this analysis, Lexipol’s use-of-force policy has a nonexhaustive229 list of nineteen different factors that an officer should keep
in mind when deciding whether to use force, and supervisors
should consider when determining whether an officer’s use of
force was reasonable:
(a) The apparent immediacy and severity of the threat to
deputies or others (Penal Code § 835a).
(b) The conduct of the individual being confronted, as reasonably perceived by the officer at the time (Penal Code
§ 835a).
(c) Officer/subject factors (age, size, relative strength, skill
level, injuries sustained, level of exhaustion or fatigue,
the number of officers available vs. subjects).
(d) The conduct of the involved officer leading up to the use
of force (Penal Code § 835a).
(e) The effects of suspected drugs or alcohol.
(f) The individual’s apparent mental state or capacity (Penal
Code § 835a).
(g) The individual’s apparent ability to understand and comply with officer commands (Penal Code § 835a).
(h) Proximity of weapons or dangerous improvised devices.
(i) The degree to which the subject has been effectively restrained and his/her ability to resist despite being
restrained.
(j) The availability of other reasonable and feasible options
and their possible effectiveness (Penal Code § 835a).
(k) Seriousness of the suspected offense or reason for contact
with the individual prior to and at the time force is used.
(l) Training and experience of the officer.

228 See Schwartz, supra note 226, at 545 (describing these pressures on law enforcement decision-making).
229 See, e.g., ANAHEIM POLICE DEP’T, POLICY MANUAL § 300.3.3: FACTORS USED TO
DETERMINE THE REASONABLENESS OF FORCE, supra note 136, at 50 (explaining that the
factors deputies should take into consideration “include but are not limited to” this list).
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(m) Potential for injury to officers, suspects, bystanders, and
others.
(n) Whether the person appears to be resisting, attempting
to evade arrest by flight, or is attacking the deputy.
(o) The risk and reasonably foreseeable consequences of
escape.
(p) The apparent need for immediate control of the subject or
a prompt resolution of the situation.
(q) Whether the conduct of the individual being confronted
no longer reasonably appears to pose an imminent threat
to the officer or others.
(r) Prior contacts with the subject or awareness of any propensity for violence.
(s) Any other exigent circumstances.230
Lexipol’s policy has the proviso that deputies should take
these nineteen factors into consideration “as time and circumstances permit.”231 But given all we know about human decisionmaking under high-pressure, high-stress circumstances, it would
seem nearly impossible for officers to remember all of these factors, much less give proper credence to them when deciding
whether to use force and how much force is reasonable. It seems
even less likely that officers could additionally bring to mind the
facts and holdings of prior court decisions at the level of detail
described in Isayeva when deciding whether and how to act.232
But one need not delve deep into human-error research to
reach the conclusion that officers are unlikely to consult the facts
and holdings of prior court decisions when deciding whether to
use force. As Judge James Browning has written, this assumption
underlying the Supreme Court’s qualified immunity doctrine defies common sense. As he wrote, “It strains credulity to believe
that a reasonable officer, as he is approaching a suspect to arrest,
is thinking to himself: ‘Are the facts here anything like the facts

230 Id. at 50–51. For another list of possible considerations, see STOUGHTON ET AL.,
supra note 132, at 52–53 (describing twenty-four factors relevant in analyzing the appropriateness of the use of force).
231 ANAHEIM POLICE DEP’T, supra note 136, at 50.
232 See supra notes 111–12 and accompanying text.
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in York v. City of Las Cruces?’” 233 Instead, Judge Browning
imagined:
It is far more likely that, in their training and continuing education, police officers are taught general principles, and, in
the intense atmosphere of an arrest, police officers rely on
these general principles, rather than engaging in a detailed
comparison of their situation with a previous Supreme Court
or published Tenth Circuit case.”234
Even the Supreme Court has suggested—in contexts other
than qualified immunity—that officers cannot effectively engage
in intricate analyses of legal rules when making fast-moving decisions on the job.235 For example, in Atwater v. City of Lago
Vista,236 the Court gave police broad power to conduct warrantless
arrests for misdemeanors, rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that
such arrests should be limited to certain circumstances in part on
the ground that the proposed “distinctions between permissible
and impermissible arrests for minor crimes strike us as ‘very unsatisfactory line[s]’ to require police officers to draw on a moment’s notice.”237
The Supreme Court has also observed—again, in contexts
other than qualified immunity—that generalized tests are more
conducive to the realities of police decisionmaking than are precise rules. For example, when describing the standard for “particularized suspicion,” the Court explained:
The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with
probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities was articulated as such, practical people formulated certain commonsense conclusions about human behavior; jurors as factfinders are permitted to do the same—and so are law enforcement officers. Finally, the evidence thus collected must be
seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars,

233 Manzanares v. Roosevelt Cnty. Adult Det., 331 F. Supp. 3d 1260, 1293 n.10
(D.N.M. 2018).
234 Id. at 1294 n.10.
235 For discussion of the Supreme Court’s forgiveness of police errors, see generally
Wayne A. Logan, Police Mistakes of Law, 61 EMORY L.J. 69 (2011).
236 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
237 Id. at 350 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 157 (1925)).
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but as understood by those versed in the field of law
enforcement.238
Similarly, in Illinois v. Gates,239 the Court rejected a “rigid
demand that specific ‘tests’ be satisfied by every informant’s tip”
instead of a more generalized “totality-of-the-circumstances approach” because probable cause is, like particularized suspicion,
“a fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in
particular factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced
to a neat set of legal rules.”240 As the Court explained, officers deciding whether probable cause exists are faced with greatly varying facts and circumstances, and “[r]igid legal rules are ill-suited
to an area of such diversity.”241
In these decisions, the Supreme Court has assumed that police officers are best guided by generalized tests that allow them
to make “common sense conclusions about human behavior,” and
rejected the notion that officers should be required to parse precise legal tests while on the job.242 The Court’s descriptions of officers’ limited ability to make fine-tuned distinctions in Atwater,
Cortez, and Gates resonates with human-error research and common sense. Yet, in the qualified immunity context, the Court has
unjustifiably taken the opposite approach—rejecting the notion
that officers will be on notice of the reasonableness of their conduct by dint of their familiarity with Graham’s totality of circumstances approach and, instead, expecting that officers know about
court decisions applying Graham and will parse the factual distinctions between cases when deciding whether to use force.
***
Part III showed that officers are not educated about the facts
and holdings of court opinions that clearly establish the law for
qualified immunity purposes. As this Part has shown, the expectations of notice and reliance upon which qualified immunity doctrine depends would not be satisfied even if law enforcement officers spent significantly more time learning about the law. There
could never be sufficient time to train officers about all the court

238
239
240
241
242

United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981).
462 U.S. 213 (1983).
Id. at 230–32.
Id. at 232.
Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418.
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cases that might clearly establish the law for qualified immunity
purposes. Even if officers were trained about the facts and holdings of more cases, they would only constitute one small part of
officers’ understanding about the scope of their authority. And,
even if officers were able to learn about and retain information
about the factual distinctions between these cases, they would be
exceedingly unlikely to analogize or distinguish a situation
rapidly unfolding before them to the court decisions they once
studied.
V. MOVING FORWARD
This Article has shown that foundational assumptions underlying the Supreme Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence are
false. The Supreme Court expects that officers know about court
decisions applying Graham and Garner and consider the facts
and holdings of those decisions when deciding whether to use
force. Yet California law enforcement officers are infrequently
taught about Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court cases applying
Graham and Garner, and are highly unlikely to learn anything
about the facts and holdings of these cases even when they are.
Moreover, even if significantly more time were spent teaching law
enforcement officers about the law, the notion that officers would
consider the facts and holdings of these cases in the moments
leading up to a use of force defies human-error research, common
sense, and the Supreme Court’s own assertions about law enforcement officers’ ability to apply intricate rules while doing their
jobs. In this Part, I consider the implications of these findings for
ongoing debates about the failures of qualified immunity doctrine
to achieve its intended goals, ways in which Congress or the Supreme Court might reform the doctrine, and the ways in which
lower courts should approach qualified immunity motions going
forward.
A. The Case Against Qualified Immunity
This Article strengthens the already strong case against
qualified immunity. When the Supreme Court created qualified
immunity, it described the doctrine as reflecting the common law
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when § 1983 was enacted.243 But Professor William Baude and
others have shown that there was no defense comparable to qualified immunity in existence when § 1983 became law.244
The Court later justified qualified immunity on policy
grounds, as necessary to shield government officials from financial liability and the costs and burdens of defending themselves
in insubstantial cases.245 But qualified immunity is unnecessary
to shield government officials from the burdens of defending
themselves in “insubstantial lawsuits.”246 Instead, there are many
other barriers to relief for insubstantial cases—and substantial
ones as well—including the challenges of getting a lawyer, pleading plausible claims, proving constitutional violations, and convincing sometimes skeptical juries of the merits of the plaintiff’s
allegations.247
Even when officers are found to have violated the Constitution, qualified immunity is unnecessary to shield officers from financial liability because they are virtually always indemnified by
their government employers. In the rare instances in which officers are denied indemnification, they remain unlikely to be held
personally liable because plaintiffs and their attorneys have little
financial incentive to press their claims against an officer with

243 See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967); see also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509
U.S. 259, 268 (1993) (asking whether immunities “were so well established in 1871, when
§ 1983 was enacted, that ‘we presume that Congress would have specifically so provided
had it wished to abolish’ them” (quoting Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554–55)); Malley v. Briggs,
475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986) (“[O]ur role is to interpret the intent of Congress in enacting
§ 1983, not to make a freewheeling policy choice, and that we are guided in interpreting
Congress’ intent by the common-law tradition.”).
244 See Albert W. Alschuler, Herring v. United States: A Minnow or a Shark?, 7 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 463, 501–07 (2010); William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106
CALIF. L. REV. 45, 51–61 (2018); JAMES E. PFANDER, CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS AND THE WAR
ON TERROR 16–17 (2017); Smith, supra note 67, at 2100; Ann Woolhandler, Patterns of
Official Immunity and Accountability, 37 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 396, 414–22 (1987).
245 See Pierson, 386 U.S. at 555 (describing qualified immunity as necessary to shield
officers from financial liability); Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814 (describing qualified immunity
as necessary to protect against “the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues,
[ ] the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office,” and “the danger that
fear of being sued will ‘dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties’” (second alteration in
original) (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949))).
246 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814.
247 See Joanna C. Schwartz, After Qualified Immunity, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 338–
60 (2020) (describing these hurdles).
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limited personal resources.248 For all of these reasons, qualified
immunity has proven unnecessary and ill-suited to achieve its intended policy goals.
The fact that qualified immunity does not achieve its intended goals does not mean the doctrine is harmless. If qualified
immunity were simply an ineffective appendage of § 1983, then
courts, congresspeople, protestors, and advocacy groups across
the political spectrum would not be calling for its abolition. Instead, growing calls to end qualified immunity are fueled by concerns that the doctrine undermines government accountability.
The Supreme Court’s definition of “clearly established law”—and
requirement that plaintiffs can defeat qualified immunity only if
they can identify prior court decisions holding unconstitutional
virtually identical facts—is the primary focus of these critiques.249
Because courts can grant officers qualified immunity simply because plaintiffs cannot find a prior similar case, qualified immunity can deny relief to plaintiffs whose constitutional rights have
been violated and can shield officers from liability even when they
have behaved maliciously or recklessly.250 Court opinions granting qualified immunity can also harm government accountability—by sending the message to officers that they can “shoot first
and think later” and sending the message to people that their
rights do not matter.251
This Article shows that the Supreme Court’s definition of
“clearly established law,” which leads to these harmful results, is
based on a false premise. The Supreme Court has made clear its
view that the law is not clearly established by watershed decisions like Graham and Garner but, instead, by decisions applying
those general principles to similar factual circumstances. The
Court has repeatedly explained that the need for factually similar
248 See Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 912–17
(2014) (describing the prevalence of indemnification); see also Joanna C. Schwartz, Qualified Immunity and Federalism All the Way Down, 109 GEO. L.J. 305, 333–35 (2020) (describing the disinclination of plaintiffs to seek money from officers who are not indemnified).
249 The Court’s definition of “clearly established law” is not, however, the only way in
which qualified immunity doctrine undermines government accountability. Qualified immunity increases the costs, complexity, and risk of civil rights litigation—which may cause
attorneys not to accept low damages cases or decline to bring civil rights cases altogether.
See Schwartz, supra note 247, at 338–44. Qualified immunity also leads to constitutional
uncertainty and stagnation, because courts can grant qualified immunity without ruling
on the merits of plaintiffs’ constitutional claims. See id. at 358.
250 See id.
251 See id. at 313 (quoting Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1162 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)).
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court decisions is based upon principles of fair notice, and has repeatedly maintained that officers do, in fact, know about and rely
on those court decisions before taking action.252
Yet all available evidence makes clear that officers are not on
notice of these court decisions. There are hundreds or thousands
of cases that could be used to clearly establish the law regarding
the constitutional bounds of uses of force, searches, seizures, arrests, and other types of police behavior. If we take seriously the
Supreme Court’s assertion that qualified immunity is about fair
notice, then officers should presumably be educated about all of
these decisions. But most California police officer trainings do not
include information about the facts and holdings of any cases that
apply Graham and Garner. Instead, police policies and trainings
focus primarily on the broad rules in Graham and Garner—precisely the broad rules that the Supreme Court has said are insufficient to clearly establish the law. When officers are educated
about other Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit use-of-force decisions
applying Graham and Garner, those decisions are most often used
to articulate other broad principles—like the notion that officers
do not need to use the least intrusive force available, so long as
their use of force is reasonable. And, to the extent that trainings
concern the application of Graham and Garner to various factual
scenarios, those scenarios are not based on court decisions.
Moreover, even if officers were informed about cases applying
Graham and Garner to various factual scenarios, all available evidence about decision-making under conditions of stress makes
clear that officers would not recall or rely on these decisions when
deciding whether to use force.253 Instead, it is far more likely, as
Judge Browning observed, that officers would consider the general principles they have been taught, and then apply those principles to the circumstances they are facing—precisely the type of
exercise in which officers engage during their basic and in-service
trainings.254 In contexts other than qualified immunity, the Supreme Court has embraced this understanding of how law enforcement officers make decisions on the job.255 And this is, in fact,
the very approach that California POST and Lexipol have reiterated in their policy and training materials; that officers should
252
253
254
255

See supra Part I.B (describing the Court’s assumption).
See supra Part IV.C.
See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 235–36 and accompanying text.
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learn the general “totality of the circumstances” framework for
the use of force, and get comfortable applying that framework to
the unending variation in factual scenarios officers are destined
to confront.256
Qualified immunity doctrine has no basis in the law, fails to
achieve its intended policy goals, and undermines government accountability. And, as this Article shows, among the most pernicious aspects of the doctrine—its requirement that plaintiffs identify cases in which courts have held unconstitutional nearly
identical conduct—is based on a misunderstanding of the role
court decisions play in law enforcement policies and trainings,
and officers’ decisions on the street. What, then, should be done?
B. Possible Reforms
In my view, the Supreme Court or Congress should do away
with qualified immunity. But if they choose, instead, to reform
the doctrine, they should adjust their definition of “clearly established law” to comport with evidence about what officers actually
know about the law.
1. End qualified immunity.
Mounting evidence of qualified immunity’s failures offers ample justification for Congress or the Supreme Court to abolish
qualified immunity. Defenders of qualified immunity offer terrifying predictions about a world without the doctrine: as a Republican congressman stated in support of a bill he introduced that
would codify qualified immunity, “[e]nding qualified immunity is
another way of saying abolish the police” because “criminals”
would bring “endless frivolous lawsuits” and police officers would
be “forced to quit, because they couldn’t afford to serve any
longer.”257 But, as I have predicted in prior work, these horrors
would not come to pass. Police officers would continue to be indemnified, and frivolous cases would continue to be weeded out of
court.258

256

See supra Part III.B–C.
Rep. Banks Introduces Qualified Immunity Act, U.S. CONGRESSMAN JIM BANKS
(Aug. 7, 2020), https://perma.cc/WF9R-WSVX.
258 See generally Schwartz, supra note 247 (describing these predictions with regards
to frivolous cases); Schwartz, supra note 248 (describing these predictions with regards to
indemnification).
257
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Of particular relevance to this discussion, in a world without
qualified immunity and the insistence on “clearly established
law,” there would still be legal protections for officers who act reasonably. Courts would still assess whether officers’ decisions to
use force were reasonable under the framework supplied by Graham—which requires that courts consider the totality of the circumstances not “with the 20/20 vision of hindsight” but with the
recognition that “police officers are often forced to make splitsecond judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain,
and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary
in a particular situation.”259
Courts, in assessing whether an officer’s use of force was reasonable, would also continue to rely on prior court decisions.
Courts’ analyses could still be guided by court decisions that clarify the Graham framework, by, for example, stating that officers
do not have to use the least force available so long as they act
reasonably.260 And courts would still be able to analogize to and
distinguish from the facts and holdings of prior court decisions
when determining whether an officer’s use of force violated the
Constitution.261 The key difference would be that, in a world
without qualified immunity, courts could not dismiss a case
simply because there was not a prior decision in which a court
held virtually identical conduct to be unconstitutional.
I have previously argued that qualified immunity should be
eliminated because it has no basis in the common law, is ill-suited
and unnecessary to achieve its intended policy goals, and undermines government accountability.262 The findings in this Article
add more fuel to the flame.
2. Redefine “clearly established law.”
If Congress or the Supreme Court decides to amend qualified
immunity instead of ending it, the definition of “clearly established law” should be at the top of the list for adjustment. The
argument in favor of some form of qualified immunity is that it
259

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97.
See, e.g., supra notes 173–78 and accompanying text.
261 See supra notes 91–112 and accompanying text (describing the ways in which the
Ninth Circuit in Isayeva could have analogized to and distinguished from the facts and
holdings in Bryan, Brooks, and Mattos to determine whether Officer Tereschenko’s conduct was reasonable).
262 See generally Schwartz, supra note 11.
260
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limits liability to cases where officers had notice that their conduct was unconstitutional and so “gives government officials
breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments
about open legal questions.”263 But this Article has shown that police officers do not actually know about the facts and holdings of
the cases that the Supreme Court says are necessary to clearly
establish the law.
One might counter that, even if officers are not actually on
notice of these cases, the existence or absence of a prior court decision holding similar conduct unconstitutional is an adequate
proxy for whether an officer should be held liable. But by what
logic should the extent of an officer’s “breathing room” depend on
whether another officer has been successfully sued for similar
conduct in the past? The current definition of “clearly established
law” protects officers who have behaved in an outrageous manner—and officers who have intentionally engaged in misconduct—so long as: (1) no officer did something similar in the past;
or (2) an officer did something similar in the past but that conduct
did not, for any number of reasons, produce a court decision explicating the unconstitutionality of that officer’s conduct.264 Even
if one believes that officers need some extra liability protection
beyond that already offered by the Constitution, the existence of
a prior court decision with similar facts does not create a rational
buffer.
What, then, should be the standard for qualified immunity, if
it continues to exist? To my mind, a more sensible definition of
“clearly established law” would reflect how officers are actually
educated about the scope of their authority. If the goal of qualified
immunity is to give officers fair warning or fair notice, and they
are on notice of watershed decisions like Graham and Garner—
but not educated about the facts and holdings of court decisions
applying Graham and Garner—then clearly established law
should be defined at that higher level of generality. Officers could
still have some form of immunity for conduct that did not clearly
violate the standards set out in Graham and Garner, but that

263 al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 743; see also Rep. Banks Introduces Qualified Immunity Act,
supra note 257 (quoting the National President of the Fraternal Order of Police as saying
that qualified immunity gives “reasonable officer[s] . . . a certain degree of discretion to
make split-second decisions in situations that could put lives, including their own, at
risk”).
264 See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text.
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immunity would be disentangled from the absence or existence of
court decisions holding similar conduct unconstitutional.265
An alternative would be to condition qualified immunity on
proof that officers were acting in accordance with governing laws,
policies, and training they received about the constitutional limits
of their power. By following this approach, courts would assess
the reasonableness of officers’ behavior based on what they were
actually taught about the scope of their authority.266 This proposal
would also address concerns that, absent qualified immunity, officers could be held liable for following the law as it existed at the
time they acted.267 And this approach would place the burden on
the defendant to identify what laws, policies, or trainings justified
their conduct. Given that qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, placing this burden on the defendant makes sense.
These possibilities capture some—but surely not all—of the
ways in which qualified immunity doctrine might be adjusted to
comport with evidence that officers are not, in fact, on notice of
the decisions that the Supreme Court asserts are necessary to
clearly establish the law. These alternatives would also reflect the
ways in which officers are actually educated about the scope of
their power.
Some reading this Article might reach a very different conclusion—that qualified immunity’s protections should be made
even stronger. After all, the Supreme Court has confidently and
repeatedly asserted that watershed cases like Graham and Garner do not adequately clarify the “hazy border between excessive
and acceptable force.”268 If prior court decisions are necessary to
clarify that border, and officers are not educated about those
cases, then one might conclude officers should be held liable even
less frequently than they now are.

265 For similar recommendations, see Jeffries, supra note 13, at 263 (recommending
that the “clearly established law” standard be replaced with a rule that qualified immunity
be granted absent “clearly unconstitutional” behavior); see also Wells, supra note 13, at
436–38 (arguing against qualified immunity in situations in which general principles support liability but there is not a prior case holding similar facts to be unconstitutional).
266 For discussion of the Supreme Court’s and lower courts’ view about the relevance
of police policies and trainings to the determination of whether the law is clearly established, see generally Avidan Y. Cover, Reconstructing the Right Against Excessive Force,
68 FLA. L. REV. 1773 (2016).
267 See Smith, supra note 67, at 2108–09 (expressing this concern).
268 Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1153 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mullenix v. Luma,
136 S. Ct. 305, 312 (2015)).
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But reaching this conclusion would also require concluding
that law enforcement agencies and educators across California—
and, it appears, across the country—are inadequately training
their officers about the constitutional limits of their power. As
this Article has shown, trainers educate officers about the framework set out in Graham and/or Garner—and, sometimes, general
principles drawn from a few additional cases—and then help officers get comfortable applying that framework in varying factual
scenarios.269 But they do not train officers about the cases that the
Supreme Court has said officers need to know in order to understand their constitutional authority.
The Supreme Court is usually very willing to defer to law enforcement agencies’ assertions of expertise.270 This deference to
law enforcement expertise extends to the ways in which law enforcement agencies train their officers.271 Applying that same
level of deference in the qualified immunity context would mean
that the Supreme Court should defer to agencies’ and trainers’
views that officers do not need to be educated about the facts and
holdings of cases applying Graham and Garner to understand the
scope of their authority. And that deference should lead to the
conclusion that the definition of “clearly established law” should
be more forgiving.
But if, instead, the Supreme Court or Congress maintains
that officers need to be educated about the facts and holdings of
cases applying Graham and Garner in order to understand the
extent of their power, then the fact that agencies are not training
their officers about these cases should be reason enough to hold
them liable for their officers’ misconduct. The Supreme Court has
long held that local governments can be held liable under § 1983
if they fail to adequately train their officers about the scope of
their authority and that failure “evidences a ‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of its inhabitants.”272 The Supreme Court has
also explained that an agency’s failure to teach officers about the
269

See, e.g., supra notes 157, 182–83 and accompanying text.
See generally, e.g., Anna Lvovsky, The Judicial Presumption of Police Expertise,
130 HARV. L. REV. 1995 (2017).
271 See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 598–99 (2006)(describing the “increasing professionalism of police forces” including “wide-ranging reforms in the education,
training, and supervision of police officers” (quotation marks omitted) (quoting S. WALKER,
TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1950–1990, at
51 (1993))).
272 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989).
270
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scope of their constitutional authority—including “what is required of them under this Court’s cases”—can be a basis for municipal liability.273 So, if—in the Supreme Court’s view—adequately training officers about “what is required of them” under
the Constitution requires educating them about the facts and
holdings of cases that “clearly establish the law,” the failure of
agencies across California to educate their officers about these
cases should be a basis for municipal liability when their officers
use excessive force.
To be clear, I do not believe that local governments should be
expected to train their officers about all of the cases that clearly
establish the law. But if the qualified immunity standard is not
adjusted—or officers are granted more qualified immunity protections because they are not educated about the cases applying Graham and Garner—then liability should shift to local governments.
C. A Path Forward for Lower Courts
If the Supreme Court or Congress does not abolish qualified
immunity or formally change the definition of “clearly established
law,” lower courts considering qualified immunity motions should
keep this Article’s findings in mind. True, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly instructed lower courts not to define “clearly established law . . . at a high level of generality.”274 And the Court has
repeatedly reversed lower courts in recent years for finding that
insufficiently similar court decisions clearly established the
law.275 But there remains some flexibility in Supreme Court precedent—the Court has repeatedly observed that plaintiffs need not
point to prior precedent to defeat a qualified immunity motion
when the constitutional violation is obvious, and the Court has
offered shifting guidance about how factually similar a prior decision must be to clearly establish the law.276 Professor Richard
Re has argued that lower courts have the power to legitimately
narrow Supreme Court precedent under these types of circumstances—meaning they can “interpret[ ] a precedent more
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Hudson, 547 U.S. at 599.
White, 137 S. Ct. at 552 (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742).
275 See, e.g., id.; Emmons, 139 S. Ct. at 503; Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1152–53; Mullenix,
136 S. Ct. at 308–09; City & County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1775–
78 (2015).
276 See supra Part II.
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narrowly than it is best read”—so long as their reading of the law
is “reasonable.”277
Courts already vary in their willingness to grant qualified
immunity motions. Professors Aaron Nielson and Christopher
Walker have found significant differences in qualified immunity
grant rates depending on the circuit in which the motion is
brought and the political party of the president who appointed the
judges on the panel.278 A cursory review of the analyses and holdings in the 284 Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit decisions reviewed for the purposes of this study make clear that judges on
the Ninth Circuit vary in their views about how factually similar
prior court decisions must be to clearly establish the law. Evidence that officers do not in fact learn about the facts and holdings of these decisions or rely upon them when doing their job is
further reason for lower courts to lean on the Court’s more capacious descriptions of “clearly established law” when considering
defendants’ qualified immunity motions.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s qualified immunity doctrine sends
plaintiffs’ attorneys on nearly impossible quests for “clearly established law.” Success is elusive given the factual variation
across cases, courts’ ability to grant qualified immunity without
ruling on the constitutionality of officers’ conduct, and the Court’s
requirement that the prior cases concern virtually identical facts.
Although this requirement is described as a way of ensuring that
officers are on notice of the unconstitutionality of their conduct,
this study shows that officers are not actually educated about the
facts and holdings of court decisions that clearly establish the
law. Instead, they are taught broad principles from watershed
cases like Graham and Garner, and then are given experience applying those frameworks to varying factual situations not based
on court decisions. And even if officers did spend more time learning about court decisions applying Graham and Garner, humanerror research and common sense suggest that officers would not
analogize and distinguish their facts with those in court decisions
277 See Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 GEO.
L.J. 921, 925–26, 932 (2016).
278 See Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, The New Qualified Immunity, 89
S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 39–49 (2015); Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, Strategic Immunity, 66 EMORY L.J. 55, 101–10 (2016).
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when deciding how to act. Even the Supreme Court has recognized, in other areas of the law, that police officers are not well
suited to make these types of fine-grained decisions while doing
their jobs.
For all of these reasons, the Court’s demand for “clearly established law” makes as much logical sense as does King Pelias’s
requirement that Jason find a ram with golden fleece to secure
the throne in Thessaly.279 Calls are mounting for the Supreme
Court or Congress to abolish or reform qualified immunity. This
Article offers yet one additional reason to reconsider the doctrine.
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See Hamilton, supra note 1, at 117–30.

